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The climate  of  relations  between  the  European  Community  and 
the United States  has  improved  remarkably since  the  first publi-
cation of this booklet, in January 1971.  Confrontation has yielded 
to  compromise.  Channels of communication  between  the  world's 
two  major trading  powers are  reopening.  Reason,  resignation to 
hard  choices,  and  negotiation are  replacing  threats  and  accusa-
tions,  lest both  partners lose. 
The European Community and the United States faced the pros-
pect  of  trade  war after  President  Richard  M.  Nixon's  unilateral 
announcement on August 15,  1971,  cutting the do([ar's tie to gold 
and imposing a 10 per cent import surcharge. Overnight the post-
war monetary arrangements had ended  and  the  principle of free 
trade  had  been  ca([ed  into  question.  Instead  of  retaliating,  the 
European Community entered into neC)otiations.  Through compro-
mise,  trade war was averted. 
If these events hold a lesson, it must be that a permanent system 
of mutual  consultation  should  be  maintained.  From  a  3,000  mile 
distance, undiscussed differences of perspective can blot out the 
broad  outline of common  interests. 
The  United  States  has  hinted  that  it will  "no  longer  pay  an 
economic  price  for  Europe's  non-existent  political  unity."  This 
booklet shows that the United  States has  benefited,  not suffered, 
from  Europe's  nascent  unity.  It  places  minor  differences  in 
perspective. 
The  European Community today, although not yet united politi-
cally,  is  much  more  than  a  great  trading  bloc.  Its expansion  to 
a scale more comparable to that of the  United  States  has height-
ened its awareness of worldwide responsibilities and of the  need 
to exercise a leadership role commensurate with its position. i 
I 
!·I  ,;: 
1  I 
i;' 
!' 
lr 
AUNITED I 
EUROPE 
In  the  spring  of 1945  the  democratic world system,  which  for  a 
century had  promised  man  limitless progress towards peace and 
plenty,  lay in  ruins.  Of  the  major  democratic  nations,  only  the 
United States was intact. Western Europe was torn and exhausted. 
The  Soviet  Union  emerged  victorious  and  war-weary.  Stalin's 
armies, arrayed across the center of Europe, stood ready to spring 
upon the thin remains of European  democracy, then beset by ag-
gressive national units of the Communist International. 
To  prevent  the  extinction of  European  democracy, the  United 
States  mounted the  Marshall  Plan  and  forged  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty Organization  (NATO)  alliance.  These  acts turned the  tide, 
but economic and  military aid  from  outside  could not alone  save 
Europe  indefinitely.  Europe's  political  and  economic  structure 
needed revolutionary  change.  The  nation-state  system  had  bred 
centuries  of bloody  wars;  now  it  was  delaying,  perhaps  danger-
ously,  Europe's economic recovery. EUROPE'S  FIRST  STEP  TOWARD  UNITY 
Many men in Europe and the United States, in the aftermath of the 
war,  believed  that  nothing  less  would  suffice  than  an  Atlantic 
Federation,  marrying  the  strength  and  optimism  of America  to 
exhausted Europe. But there was little support in the United States 
for sharing sovereignty,  and  much  fear on  the  part of Europeans 
that their distinctive cultures would be crushed in the embrace of 
the American giant. 
The Atlantic option was preempted on May 9,  1950,  when Jean 
Monnet  and  Robert  Schuman  proposed  the  creation  of  the  six-
nation European Coal and Steel  Community (ECSC)  to  be  run  by 
a  supranational  European  institution  as  a  first  step  toward  an 
economically  and  politically  united  Europe. 
The US Government welcomed the initiative. Later it gave all-out 
support to the  creation  of the  Common  Market and  high  priority 
to broadening the  Community to  include  Britain and any member 
of the European  Free Trade  Association  (EFT  A)  willing  and  able 
to join. 
US  support  went  beyond  hardheaded  Government  approval. 
The project of forging a powerful United States of Europe, ending 
forever the threat of  European  war,  fired  American  imaginations. 
Too, the seeming imitation of American experience was flattering. 
PRESIDENT  KENNEDY'S  GRAND  DESIGN 
American  excitement  over  Europe's  search  for  unity  found  its 
fullest expression  in  President John  F.  Kennedy's  Grand  Design 
for  an  Atlantic  Partnership  between  the  new  Europe  and  the 
United States. The President summed up the mood of the times: 
"We do not regard a strong and  united Europe as a rival but a 
partner ... capable  of  playing  a  greater  role  in  the  common 
·defense,  of responding  more generously to the  needs  of  poorer 
nations,  of joining with the  United States  and  others in  lowering 
trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce and commodities 
and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic 
and  diplomatic areas . . .  . 
"The United  States  will  be·  ready for  a  declaration  of interde-
pendence ....  We will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe 
the  ways  and  means  of forming  an  Atlantic  partnership ... be-
tween  the  new  union emerging  in  Europe  and  the  old  American 
union founded  here  175  years ago." I 
1.  Kennedy, John F.  Independence Day Address, Philadelphia,  Pa ..  July 4,  1972. 
2 THE  WILTING  ROSE 
The  US  political and  economic  interest  in  broadening  and  deep-
ening cooperation at all  levels with the European Community has 
grown  mightily.  Despite  this  imperative,  in  recent  years  the 
generous spirit of partnership has  been  progressively  eroded  by 
one of narrow commercialism on  both  sides of the Atlantic. 
Americans  often  depict  the  Common  Market  as  repaying  US 
postwar assistance  and  leadership towards  an  open world econ-
omy with the cynicism of economic nationalism: erecting bristling 
walls  of  trade  barriers  to  US  products,  fighting  reform  of  the 
international monetary system, and  luring more and  more nations 
inside  and  outside  Europe  into  preferential  economic  arrange-
ments which discriminate commercially agaiost the  United States 
without offering any redeeming  political virtue. 
Europeans, for their part, see the mirror image of the American 
picture.  They  tend  .to  see  the  United  States  as  a  disingenuous 
giant trying to eat its cake and have  it.  It dominates the world and 
challenges  outer space  with  its  technology,  exploits the  primacy 
of the dollar to buy up European  industries on  credit,  and  at  the 
same  time  scurries  self-righteously  to  protect  its  less  efficient 
industries from the first breath  of competition. 
Sentiments such as these are voiced not just by nee-isolationists 
in  the  United  States  or chauvinists  in  Europe  but by  champions 
of liberal internationalism and  the Grand Design. 
A  senior  US  Senator,  for  example,  commented: 
"I  regret  that  the  European  Common  Market  is  increasingly 
taking on the appearance of a narrow, inward-looking protectionist 
bloc whose  trade  policies  as  they  affect  agricultural  as  well  as 
industrial  products  increasingly  discriminate  against  non-mem-
bers ... Western Europe should know from  a friend that the CAP 
[common  agricultural  policy],  as  it  is  presently constituted,  runs 
the  risk  of  alienating  the  US  farm  bloc  which  traditionally  has 
had  a  liberalizing effect  on  US  trade  policy.  Such  alienation  of 
support could be  decisive."  2 
From the European side, a French author, publisher, and ardent 
"European" said: 
"The Common  Market has  become  a new  Far  West for Ameri-
can  businessmen.  Their  investments  do  not  so  much  involve  a 
transfer of capital, as  an  actual seizure of power within the Euro-
pean  economy.  Statistics  fail  to  reflect  the  real  gravity  of  the 
problem ....  "3 
2.  Javits, Jacob K.  Congressional Record, Vol. 115,  No. 187,  November 13,  1969, 
s 14253. 
3.  Servan-Schreiber.  J.J.  The  American  Challenge,  Atheneum,  New York,  1968, 
page 11. 
3 CHANGING  ATTITUDES 
There are  understandable reasons for the souring  of transatlantic 
attitudes. 
Historically, the  mood  change  began  with  the  French  veto  on 
January 14,  1963,  of  Britain's application for Community member-
ship.  It chilled American hopes for fast progress towards partner-
ship.  It  simultaneously stalled progress toward European political 
unification. 
These events coincided with a sharp decline in  Soviet pressure 
on Western Europe as Moscow absorbed the lesson of its unhappy 
confrontation with the United States in Cuba and became increas-
ingly  preoccupied  with  its  ideological  struggle  with  Communist 
China. 
As  the  felt  need  for  a  tight military  and  political  partnership 
with the United States ebbed in Europe, fears grew with the Cuban 
missile crisis and  the  deepening  US  military involvement in  Viet-
nam  that too close  an  association  with  the  United  States  could 
drag Europe into wars in  defense of extra-European interests. 
BREAKDOWN  OF  ECONOMIC  DIALOGUE 
The  economic climate  darkened before the  ink had  dried on  the 
Kennedy  Round  agreement,  reducing  tariffs  to  an  all-time  low. 
Businessmen  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  reported  "ruinous" 
floods of imports. Protectionists in the US Congress tried to justify 
import  controls  by  pointing  to  alleged  unfair  practices  by  the 
Community and other trading powers. Brussels retorted by remind-
ing anyone  who  would  listen  of American  sins  against the  spirit 
and  the  letter  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT).  Preoccupied with domestic issues, both the United States 
and the  Community only half-listened to the other's complaints. 
In  the  United  States,  inflation  raged,  fueled  by  an  unpopular 
war,  while unemployment shot to a post-Depression high.  Protest-
ing exports of jobs abroad to American-owned plants, the AFL-CIO 
Economic Policy Committee gave up its traditional support for free 
trade  in  favor of import and  foreign  investment  controls.  The  US 
balance-of-payments deficit ass'umed  massive dimensions in 1971, 
and for the first time in  more than a hundred years, even the trade 
account ran in the red.  Prominent Americans said that it was time 
the United States stopped paying the economic price for Europe's 
"non-existent political unity." 
POSTWAR  ERA  ENDS 
Against  the  backdrop  of  transatlantic  sniping  and  insensitivity 
to either side's "legitimate" concerns, President Richard M.  Nixon 
announced  his new economic policy.  No  longer would  the  United 
4 States  sell  gold to  foreign  nations  in  exchange  for their  surplus 
dollars.  Instead of being valued in  terms of gold, the dollar would 
"float" in exchange  dealings until  market forces  had  set  its  new 
value  in  relation to other currencies. This announcement abruptly 
ended the postwar Bretton Woods monetary arrangements,  based 
on  dollar convertibility, fixed  exchange rates,  and  an  "adjustment 
process"  which  forced  nations  to  curtail  domestic  inflation to 
protect their reserves  and their competitive positions.  But the  US 
widening deficits and  monetary  crises,  past and  present,  proved 
that the old system  no  ionger worked. 
Reversing  its postwar free  trade  policy,  the  United  States  im-
posed a 10  per cent surcharge on all imports,  to remain  in effect 
until settlement of US complaints of discrimination. The surcharge, 
the  United  States  insisted,  was  not  a  negotiating  tool  for  trade 
talks  but  rather  a  monetary  measure  to  improve  its  balance  of 
payments. 
The United States would  negotiate with its "friends for a mone-
tary order responsive to the needs and  conditions of this genera-
tion .... If other governments will make tangible progress toward 
dismantling specific barriers to trade ...  and  will be  prepared to 
allow  market  realities  freely  to  determine  exchange  rates  for 
their currencies for a transitional period,  we,  for our part,  would 
be  prepared to remove  the  [import] surcharge."4 
COMMUNITY  REFRAINS  FROM  RETALIATION 
A vacationing  Europe  blinked  in  shock  and  disbelief.  No  matter 
how  intended,  the  surcharge affected  87  per cent  ($5.74  billion) 
of the Community's exports to the  United States,  12.8 per cent of 
its total exports in 1970. The surcharge wiped out most of the tariff 
concessions obtained through careful balancing of interests in the 
Dillon and  Kennedy  Rounds  of GATT  negotiations. 
Nevertheless,  in the  common interest of avoiding  a trade war, 
the  Community  did  not  retaliate.  It  entered  into  negotiations, 
although preoccupied at the time with negotiations for expansion 
and  with  plans for economic  and  monetary  union. 
SUCCESS  WITHIN  REACH 
Paradoxically, US  disenchantment came  at a time when the Com-
munity had  discovered  a  new  sense  of political  purpose.  "Euro-
4.  Connally,  John  M.  Address,  Annual  Meeting  of the  Boards  of Governors  of 
the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International 
Development  Association,  Washington,  DC,  September  30,  1971. 
5 crats" glowed with the  confidence gained  in  the Kennedy  Round 
when  the  "Six," speaking  with  one  voice,  had  for  the  first  time 
dealt with  the  United  States  as  an  equal  trading  partner.  Hope 
revived for Kennedy's Grand Design. The 1969 summit meeting of 
the Six in  The  Hague had reawakened the  integration process by 
decisions to forge full economic and  monetary union and to open 
membership negotiations. 
The  United  States  sceptically  greeted  the  news  of  these  two 
most visible signs of the Community's progress toward the  polit_i-
cal  unity  it  had  so  lonq  encouraged.  One  European  statesman 
wonders if the United States has lost its "sense of success.  Were 
it not for  American  policy  over  the  past  two  decades,  Western 
Europe would  never  have  reached  its  present  point.  The  United 
States should actually congratulate itself, for it has helped Europe 
achieve what it has recommended: West Et:ropean unification has 
come within reach." s 
A  former  Marshall  Plan  administrator,  an  American,  assigned 
part of the  blame for the  US  state of mind to "disappointment of 
its unrealistic expectations of Atlantic  partnership."6 
After all, had not the Community's founding fathers recognized: 
"Europe will not be  made all at once, or according to a  single, 
general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which 
first create a de  facto  solidarity."7 
MEANING  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
The  February 1971  decision to form  full  economic  and  monetary 
union  shows  how  "concrete  achievements"  in  the  field  of trade 
spill into the  political realm  as  a result of need. 
When  the  Common  Market Treaty was drafted,  any  mention of 
such a development was avoided for fear of alienating the finance 
ministers  who  clung  tightly  to  their  purse  strings,  symbol  of 
national sovereignty and vital instrument of domestic policy. Seven 
years later, in May 1964, after the Community's first bout of infla-
tion had proven the need for policy coordination at the operational 
level,  the  Committee  of  Central  Bank  Governors  was  formed. 
Through  trade,  excess  demand  had  quickly  spread  from  one 
member country to another before the normal Community process 
could check it. This Committee has been given the major respon-
sibility  for  day-to-day  operations,· mainly  keeping  the  member 
5.  Brandt,  Willy.  "Germany's  Westpolitik.  Foreign  Affairs.  Council  on  Foreign 
Relations,  Inc., New York,  NY,  April 1972,  page 421. 
6.  Geiger,  Theodore.  "Toward a World  of Trade Blocs?"  The  Atlantic Commu-
nity Quarterly,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  page 434. 
7.  Schuman,  Robert.  Declaration,  Paris,  May  9,  1950. 
6 countries' currencies constant in  relation to each other. 
Thus,  the  Community has  made  a  start,  one that could  not be 
imagined  only seven  years  ago  when  France  walked  out of  the 
Council chambers over the  issue of majority voting.  These  sover-
eign states,  united 14  short years  in  a  common  effort to achieve 
a  customs  union,  have  recognized  that  to  maintain  it,  some  na-
tional  prerogatives  have  to  be  modified.  They  have  relinquished 
some control over monetary and economic policy, but any relaxa-
tion  of  control  over  n~tional  budgets,  taxes,  credit,  and  money 
supply is  a difficult political choice, one  that influences a voter's 
decision to buy a new car or wait until next year. 
Ambassador  J.  Robert  Schaetzel,  US  Representative  to  the 
European Communities for six years, has thus assessed the signifi-
cance of monetary union: 
"The goal of such  unity by 1980  means nothing less than eco-
nomic and  political  unity  .... In  one  sense  they  [the Community 
members] have  been moving toward financial and  monetary unity 
at a relatively slow pace precisely because they do see the impli-
cations of what they are about."B 
HOW  THE  BARRE  PLAN  WORKS 
The  plan,  named  after  its  designer  Commission  Vice  President 
Raymond Barre, provides for full economic and monetary union by 
1980,  possibly  including  a  common  currency.  Its  fulfillment  will 
take hard political choices in other fiel'!s as well, such as  regional 
policy to reduce  the  differences in  wealth  between  the  rich  north 
and  the  poor south.  On  this,  and  on  the  successful  coordination 
of rates of inflation hinges the success of the venture. No member 
country wants to help another member country finance a balance-
of-payments deficit due to  "spendthrift" domestic policies. 
The  plan provides for the development of a European monetary 
personality  by  stipulating  that  the  members  should \allow  their 
currencies  to  move  only  1.125  per  cent  above  or  below  their 
official  values  instead  of  the  2.25  per cent worldwide  range.  To 
this effect, the central bank governors coordinate their interventions 
in the foreign exchange market, a function to be taken over by the 
new  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  before  the  end  of 
1973. This Fund wili absorb earlier arrangements initially for short-
term  monetary  support  of  a  member  country's  currency,  and 
perhaps  later  medium-term  support  as  well.  The  original  pool 
made available $4  billion for these  purposes. 
8.  Schaetzel,  Robert  J.  "European  Financial  and  Monetary  Union:  Its  Broad 
Implications." Address  before  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  New  York 
NY,  May 17,  1972. 
7 IMPLICATIONS  FOR  U~ITED STATES 
Tne  increased  degree  qf  political  independence from  the  United 
States which monetary and economic union will confer on Europe 
cte~:~rty  i.s  one  of  the  forces  pushing  Europe  toward  that  union. 
The  late  French President  Charles de Gaulle  may  have  been  an 
unsophisticated economist in  his defense of the  gold system,  but 
he Well  understood the relationship between monetary and  politi-
cal power.  Now tha_t  Europe  holds half the world's gold stock and 
$23 b!llion in dollar reserves, not all of them needed, it is seeking 
a voice commensurate with its eqonomic strength. It has, however, 
already demonstrated that it will use that voice to negotiate com-
pro~ises, but that they will be  true compromises. 
Commission  Vice  President  Raymond  Barre thus  assessed  the 
Washington Agreements of December 1971  for the currency align-
ment sought by the  United States: 
"The Washington  Agreements  clearly  represent  a  success  for 
[the  Community's  common  position]  since  the  currency  realign-
ment embraces the dollar, as  desired by the Community·,  and  has 
been  accompanied by abolition of the  surcharge. The co·mmunity 
has, however, contributed to the achievement of these Agreements 
by  accepting  sacrifices  which  cannot  be  underestimated.  The 
extent to which  the  Six  have  agreed  to  revalue  their  currencies 
against the  dollar is considerable." 9 
Qn  the  other side  of the  coin,  Europe's  new  cohesion  means 
that both Europe and the United States win in the debate over ex-
change rate flexibility. The Belgian Minister of Finance explained: 
"The implementation of a European monetary union will enable 
us to accept a greater degree of flexibility in world exchange rates. 
Thus,  the  wider  margins  of  fluctuation  between  currencies,  de-
cided  at Washington  as  a  provisional  measure,  might eventually 
be accepted as a permanent measure by the  European  nations, if 
only for the dealings of this European monetary body with the rest 
of the world,  but not  within the  Community  where  the  existence 
of these  margins  would  hamper  progress  toward  economic  and 
monetary unity."  10 
The  emergence  of  a  European  monetary  union  is  bound  to 
challenge,  and  dilute,  the  exclusive  dominion  of the  dollar over 
the  international  monetary  order.  Europe'~ louder  voice  in  the 
9.  Barre, Raymond.  "The Economic Situation of the Community at the Beginning 
of  1972,"  Statement  to  the  European  Parliament,  Luxembourg,  January  18, 
1972. 
10.  Vlerick, Andre. Statement at  the Annual  Meetings of the Boards of Governors 
of the  International Monetary Fund,  the International  Bank for Reconstruction 
and  Development,  the  lnternatio.nal  Finance  Corporation,  and  the  Interna-
tional  Development  Association,  Washington,  DC,  September  28,  1972. 
8 management of the world economy is certain to jar US  ears from 
time  to  time  until the  emergence  of a  new  financial  balance  of 
power. 
ENLARGED  COMMUNITY  PROVES  WISDOM  OF  US  POLiCY 
Successive US  administrations have attached high  importanc::e  to 
Britain's uniting its destiny with continental Europe. As the mqment 
approached,  however,  American  enthusiasm  wanea  with  the 
thought that the political gain of  ~ large,  strong Europe might no.t 
be worth the economic price. 
Clearly,  British  accession,  along  with  that  of  Denmark  a_nd 
Ireland,  is an  event of majO"r  economic  import~nce to the  United 
States  and  every  trading  nation.  ~ut there  is  little  eviden<:<e  to 
suggest that its effect will  be  negative for the  United  States. 
The  expanded  Community  is  the world's most  important com-
mercial  power.  Using  1971  EC  figures,  the  Nine  bqught ZS.4  per 
cent  ($11.2  billion)  of  US  exports.  Tt'Je  same  year,· the United 
States sold the Community of Nine 22.8 per cent ($10.4  billion) of 
its exports. The Nine will continue to import much more than they 
export into the foreseeable future. 
These  figures,  of course,  do  not  take  into  account  ehher the 
trade diversionary  or the  trade stimulatin9 effects of broa.dening 
the  Common  Market.  The  favorable  evolution  of  US  commercial 
relations with  the  Community  of  Six  during  its first 14 years  of 
existence  suggests  strongly that the  net  impact  will  be  positive 
not only on  US-EC trade but also on  US  investment in  the  Com-
munity, which makes an increasingly important contribution to the 
US  balance  of payments. 
THE  ENLARGED  COMMUNITY- A  NEW  PROFILE 
Community  Community  United 
of Six  of  Nine  States 
Area  (thousand  sq.  miles)  449  589  3,600 
Population (millions)  190  253  205.4 
Gross National Product 
($  billions)  534.7  694.5  1,050.4  * 
Exports ($  billions)  50.6  63.2  44.1 
Imports ($  billions)  49.1  64.2  45.6 
Percentage of world exports  19.5  27.6  17.0 
Percentage of world imports  .17.8  24.3  16.5 
Source: EC  Statistical Office 
*Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
9 NEW  MEMBERS  LOWER  TARIFFS 
It  should  be  noted,  too,  that  while  enlarging  the  Community 
broadens  the  area  of  tariff  discrimination  against  US  goods,  it 
lowers, at the same time, the average level of duties which Ameri-
can  exports  now  must  hurdle  to enter  the  combined  market  of 
the  Nine. The post-Kennedy Round  average United Kingdom  tariff 
of 7.6  per cent would  drop toward the Common Market's average 
external  tariff of 6.0  per cent.  The  average industrial  US  tariff is 
7.1  per cent (see Table page 32}. 
Just how these  contrary factors of wider discrimination versus 
lower protection  would  balance  out would ·require  a  product-by-
product analysis of US  and  EC  trade with the  new members,  in-
cluding an assessment of the competitive margins and the produc-
tion capacities of the American and EC  industries which would be 
competing  in  a  more  open  market.  Experience  with  the  existing 
Common  Market has shown,  however,  that large  US  companies, 
organized  on  a  continental  scale,  have  proved  better  able  than 
their smaller European competitors to take advantage of the wider 
market for both imported and  locally produced goods. 
The  fact remains  that  US  exports to  much of Western  Europe 
have to climb a tariff wall,  albeit a low one,  whereas goods pro-
duced inside the enlarged Common  Market do not.  But this is no 
different,  after  all,  from  the  situation  prevailing  with  respect  to 
wines purchased by New York firms from California and France. 
TECHNOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IMPELS  MARKET  FUSION 
Surging  technological  progress  virtually  compels  the  fusion  of 
small markets into larger ones.  Less than one hundred years ago, 
German cities like  Hamburg  and  Nuremberg  carried  on  "foreign 
trade" with each  other.  By  the  end  of the  century,  the  bulk  of 
foreign trade  undoubtedly will  be  conducted  between  markets of 
continental size-the United States and Canada, the Soviet Union, 
Japan, China,  India, the European Community, and a Latin Ameri-
can common market.  Indeed, the long-range thrust of the techno-
logical revolution appears to be towards an  increasingly integrated 
world economy. 
The expansion of the Community was thus a natural, and  prob-
ably  inevitable,  evolutionary  event.  And  there  is  nothing  in  the 
history of the emergence of continental-size economies to  indicate 
that they are detrimental to the development of mutually-beneficial 
international exchange of goods and services.  It is doubtful if the 
50  separate  states  of  the  United  States  collectively would  have 
constituted  as  ric-h  and  dynamic a market for foreign  goods had 
10 they_  remained  independent  sovereign·  entities  outside  a  com-
mon market. 
A WORTHY  US  PARTNER 
Basically,  of  course,  the  justification  for  the  enlargement  of the 
Community  is  as  political  as  at  its  inauguration.  One  European 
has put it this way: 
· "As far as  the enlargement of the Community is concerned,  it is 
a political  imperative ....  Western  Europe  is  too small  in  size to 
be  able to  afford to stay permanently divided  in  different groups 
among  its 20-odd  countries ....  As  a European  citizen  I  should 
also  make  quite  clear  my  conviction that the  Europeans  have  a 
right to organize their economy and their society as they consider 
it to be  in their best interest, provided they respect their interna-
tional obligations." 11 
Summing  up  the  enlarged  Community's  contribution  to  the 
future,  another European said: 
"We are far from sinking into that comfortable or uncomfortable 
decline which some less perceptive people once predicted for us. 
And one of the symptoms of our vitality is the will to bring Western 
Europe together  in  the  Community experiment.  A  strong  Europe, 
alive  to  her  responsibilities  and  in  partnership  with  the  United 
States,  is the best guarantee of a stable future for us  all." 12 
11.  Cattani,  Atilo.  Testimony  before  the  Joint  Economic  Committee  of  the  US 
Congress,  March 16,  1970. 
12.  Rippon,  Geoffrey.  Address  before  the  World  Affairs  Council,  Los  Angeles. 
January 4,  1972. 
11 BURDEN 
SHARING 2 
Perhaps no  other source of  friction between the  Community and 
the  United  States  has  caused  more  short circuits than  has  the 
"burden sharing" debate on the distribution of the costs of defense 
and of aid  to the  "Third World."  Here,  as  in  other areas,  misin-
formation distorts the  picture. 
The United States accuses Europeans of not doing their share, 
of failing  to  shoulder  the  responsibilities  of  economic  recovery, 
and of forgetting US generosity toward Europe during the Marshall 
Plan.  In the spring of 1971,  the  US  Senate,  in  the first legislative 
test of the US commitment to Europe, defeated a proposal to halve 
the  number of  US  troops  in  Europe  to  150,000.  Later  that year, 
dramatizing the end of the postwar era and of US  patience, Presi-
dent  Richard M.  Nixon  announced  his new  economic  policy,  in-
cluding a 10 per cent foreign aid  reduction. 
12 EUROPE'S  RECORD 
Europeans  reeled  in  disbelief.  This  seeming  about-face  in  US 
policy had come at a time when Europe was paying more than the 
United  States  to  maintain  US  troops  in  Europe  and  spending  a 
greater  part  of  its  national  wealth  to  aid the  df?veloping  world. 
Even US  complaints of European ingratitude for Marshall Plan aid 
seemed  unfounded.  Had  not the  Marshall  Plan  worked  as  much 
in-the US  interest as in Europe's? The US  economy, winding down 
defense production, had  to export civilian goods to maintain em-
ployment while Europe needed cash to buy US exports. True, most 
Marshall Plan  aid to the  Community's six founding members was 
in outright grants ($6.4 billion); buf$756 million was given in loans, 
96  per cent of which  has  been  repaid.  Payments  are  still  being 
made and interest is accruing on the remainder. 
Europeans felt unjustly accused  of ingratitude. The twenty-fifth 
anniversary of  the  Marshall  Plan  in  June  1972  occasioned  their 
most recent expression of thanks.  Germany established a $5  mil-
lion memorial-fund and members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  contributed  more  than 
$64,000  to the  George  C.  Marshall  Memorial  Foundation.  These 
gifts involve only small  amounts of money,  but the United States 
does not need foreign  aid. 
NATO  FACTS  AND  FIGURES 
Treatment of defense spending will be  brief. The European Com-
munity  itself  is  not  involved  in  defense,  although  its  members' 
cooperation on  economic matters  has spilled over into this area. 
In  deference to  US  wishes, the  "Euro-Group" was  formed  within 
the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)  in  1970.  Its members 13 
have pledged to increase defense spendJng by more than $2 billion 
·on a modernization program to strengthen their conventional capa-
bility.  In  addition,  Germany has  agreed to provide $79  million in 
military aid to Turkey. President Richard M.  Nixon welcomed these 
initiatives as  testifying  to  "the vitality and  spirit of the  European 
allies." 14 
The  United  States  maintains  300,000  defense-related  per-
sonnel  in  Europe,  down  from  a  high  of 434,000  during  the  1961 
Berlin  crisis.  Dependents  of  defense-related  personnel  number 
13.  "Euro-Group"  participants  are:  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and 
the Netherlands, all Community members; the United  Kingdom and  Denmark, 
members  as  of  January  1,  1973;  Norway;  and  Greece  and  Turkey,  both 
associates  of the  Community.  Of the  "Six,"  France  does  not  participate  in 
the  military  aspects  of  NATO.  Of  the  "Nine,"  Ireland  does  not  belong  to 
NATO. 
14.  Neff,  Richard.  "Europe  Joins  on  Defense."  European  Community  No.  146, 
page  14. 
13 about 240,000  of which 155,000 reside  in Germany. The operating 
cost. of US  forces in Europe amounts to about $4  billion in  fiscal 
year 1973.  The  $16  billion  figure  sometimes  cited  includes  the 
costs of all forces pledged to NATO in  case of an emergency, the 
300,000  troops  in  Europe  as  well  as  manpower  stationed  in  the 
United States and in  other parts of the globe,  including,  until  re-
cently, Vietnam.Is 
In 1971  European NATO members spent $26.7 billion on defense 
to keep nearly 3,000,000 men under arms.IG European NATO forces 
comprise  almost  90  per  cent  of  NATO's  ground  forces,  80  per 
cent of its sea power, and 75  per cent of its air power. 
While the United States spends less than 2 per cent of its gross 
national product (GNP)  on  defending Europe,  the European aver-
age for arms expenditure is  3.7 per cent,  most of which-except 
in  the  case  of Portugal-goes  to  the  defense  of  the  continent. 
Some of the larger European countries spend a much larger share 
of  GNP  on  defense:  the  United  Kingdom,  4.9  per  cent:  France, 
4.0  per cent, and Germany, 3.3 per cenf.17 
A  former  Assistant  to  the  US  Secretary  of  Defense  for  NATO 
force planning has assessed the distribution of the NATO  defense 
burden as follows: "If one starts from the premise that the  mainte-
nance  of  a reasonable  level  of  American  presence  in  Europe  is 
still very much in the American national interest as well as that of 
Europe,  the  costs  are  not  all  that  u~fairly divided-at least  in 
relation to relative wealth ....  Even though in  the past the United 
States may have  contributed somewhat  more than  its share,  and 
the Europeans somewhat less, the gap has narrowed steadily: and 
what  remains  is  not  sufficiently  demonstrable  to  be  worth  the 
political cost of arguing about." 1s 
The  intolerable  part  of  the  burden,  he  continued,  lies  in  the 
drain on the US balance of payments, occasioned not by the. com-· 
mitment of troops to NATO but rather by their deployment abroad. 
The  foreign  exchange  costs  of  "involuntary  tourism"  by  these 
trqops and their dependents as well  as their and  the  US  Govern-
ment's purchases of local services and supplies "should be moved 
out of purely bilateral channels and  placed  in  a  multilateral con-
text."  Germany,  as  the  major  beneficiary  of  the  US  military 
oresence should "pay the largest part: but the participation of the 
15.  US  Department of Defense. 
16.  NATO  Review,  "Defense Expenditures of NATO  Countries: 1949-1971,"  Janu-
ary/February 1972,  Vol.  20,  Nos.  1  &  2.  page 26. 
17.  The Military Balance: 1971-1972,  Institute for Strategic Studies, London,  1971, 
page  60. 
18.  Stanley, Timothy W.  "The Political  Economics of Defense:  Burden-Sharing." 
The  Atlantic Community Quarterly,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  The  Atlantic Council  of the 
United  States,  Inc.,  Washington,  DC,  pages 442,  443. 
14 entire Alliance should be  provided for as a matter of principle,"  19 
he suggests. 
This  could  be  a  topic  of  negotiation  in  a  reexamination  of 
responsibilities  and  obligations within NATO,  after the  European 
Security  Conference  and  the  conclusion  of  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitations  (SALT)  talks.  Both  the  United  States  and  Europe 
realize  that  some  change  within  NATO  must  accompany  new 
political, economic, and  strategic realities.  Within this reorganiza-
tion, Europe will be seeking a role of influence commensurate with 
its new responsibilities. Commented one European: "It is not fore-
seeable that the Atlantic Alliance would disappear, but the moment 
is  approaching  when  a  basic  negotiation  between  the  partners 
within the Alliance will be  necessary to redefine the commitments 
of each.  The  European  states will  have  to  decide  whether their 
increased responsibilities and  the costs of military independence, 
which they partially want and  which  they  partially must assume, 
will end up as  sacrifices without responsibility in decision-making 
and only apparent independence at  each  country's national  level 
or as a good investment with real independence and responsibility 
at the  European  levef.2D 
On  this point,  at least,  Europe and  the  United States agree.  In 
the words of President Richard M.  Nixon: 
"We  continue  to  feel  that  political  and  defense  cooperation 
within Europe will be  the  fulfillment of European  unity.  European 
and  American  interests in  defense  and  East-West  diplomacy are 
fundamentally parallel  and  give sufficient incentive for coordinat-
ing  independent policies.  Two  strong  powers  in  the  West. would 
add flexibility to Western diplomacy and  could  increasingly share 
the  responsibilities of  decision."  21 
This sharing of responsibilities may not be entirely in the hands 
of  the  United  States  and  the  Europeans  themselves.  Egypt's  re-
quest for military aid from  the  United  Kingdom,  France, ·and  Ger-
many after the Russian expulsion could foreshadow a realignment 
of the "military burden" in a depolarized world. 
ECONOMIC  AID:  EC  TRIES  HARDER 
Since the postwar recovery, the Community has gradually assumed 
a  role  of  leadership  in  aiding  the_  "Third  World."  In  1971  the 
Community "Five" members  of the  OECD's  Development  Assist-
19.  Ibid.,  page  445_ 
20.  Spinelli,  Altiero.  "Voix·,  independance,  et  personalite  de  !'Europe."  Address 
at  a  Round  Table  Discussion  on  the  Problems  Posed  by  the  Community's 
Enlargement  and  Strengthening,  Paris,  July 7-8,  1972. 
21.  Nixon,  Richard M.  US  Foreign  Policy in the  1970's,  The  White  House,  Febru-
ary 1972,  pages  4D-41. 
15 OFFICIAL  AND  PRIVATE  FOREIGN  AID- 1971 
Total  Aid  Per Cent 
($ millions)  of GNP 
Belgium  300  1.03 
Britain  1,570  1.14 
Denmark  138  .80 
France  1,656  1.02 
Germany  1,915  .88 
Ireland*  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy  862  .85 
Luxembourg•  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  590  1.63 
United States  7,045  .67 
Source:  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop-
ment,  Press Release,  July 5,  1972. 
*OECD  statistics  are  unavailable  for  Ireland  and  Luxembourg, 
which  are  not members of the OECD's  Development  Assistance 
Committee. 
ance Committee (Luxembourg does not belong) spent nearly 1 per 
cent of GNP  on  financial  aid  to the  developing  world,  compared 
with  the  US  contribution  of  0.67  per  cent  (see  Table  above). 
It  has  also contributed  its share  to the  world  food  aid  program, 
23  per cent of the total aid  in  1968-71.  In  addition, bowing to the 
wishes expressed  by  the  aid  recipients themselves,  the  Commu-
nity  encourages  them  to  trade  by  means  of  generalized  and 
specialized preferences.  The Common  Market's imports from  de-
veloping  countries  grew  from  $6.8  billion  in  1958  to  more  than 
$17.6 billion in 1971. The Community has consistently run  a trade 
deficit with the Third World,  more than $4.7  billion in 1971,  while 
the  United States has  run  a trade surplus. 
PREFERENTIAL  ACCORDS  COMPLEMENT  AID 
Nevertheless,  with  the  exception  of  the  common  agricultural 
policy,  nothing the  Community has  done  has  aroused  more criti-
cism  in  the  United  States  than  have  its  preferential  agreements 
with a growing number of African,  Mediterranean,  and  European 
nations.  The  US  Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations 
has succinctly summed up  the  US  complaint: 
"It seems to me  inappropriate for special arrangements to favor 
a few developing nations in  a particular area while discriminating 
against developing countries in other areas. Furthermore, there is 
no economic or development rationale that can  justify the exten-
16 sion of 'reverse' preferences by developing countries to the indus-
trialized nations of Western Europe." 22 
To weigh these charges, the Community's various types of pref-
erential agreements must be inspected. 
By the  fall  of 1972,  the Community had  concluded· agreements 
on  reciprocal trade preferences with  36 countries.  A single asso-
ciation agreement, the Yaounde Convention, covers arrangements 
with 19 of them,23  all former African dependencies of the  "Nine." 
As a result of Britain's decision to join the Community, 21  develop-
ing  Commonwealth  .Countries 24  have  the  option  of  following 
Mauritius' lead  by joining the Yaounde association or of choosing 
another  form  of  association.  In  addition,  Norway  and  Britain's 
other  former  EFTA  partners25  which  did  not  seek  membership 
negotiated agreements on  trade  in  industrial  goods.  Three  Com-
monwealth  countries  have  been  associated  with  the  Community 
since 1969. Two of the  preferential agreements were with Tunisia 
and  Morocco  which  had  special  trade  relations  with  France  in 
pre-Community days,  and four were with the Mediterranean coun-
tries: Malta, Spain, Israel, and Egypt. Finally, separate agreements 
with  Greece  and  Turkey  envisage  their  eventual  membership  in 
the Community.  Talks for preferential agreements are being  held 
with Lebanon, Jordan, Cyprus, and Algeria. 
DISSIMILARITY  IS  COMMON  DENOMINATOR 
The  most  obvious  aspect  of these  agreements  is  their  dissimi-
larity. Nevertheless,  the countries involved  fall  into three general 
categories:  ' 
•  Special  relationship.  Some  of  the  agreements  preserve  a 
special  trade  relationship  with  one  or  more  of  the  Community 
members before the Common Market's establishment or enlarge-
ment.  These  agreements  are  with  the  18  original  associates, 
Tunisia,  and  Morocco.  Others,  such  as  the  one  with  Kenya, 
Uganda,  and  Tanzania,  attempted  to  bridge  the  French-English 
division of Africa. 
The original associates sold more than  half their exports to the 
Community  before  its  inception.  Had  special  trade  relationships 
22.  Eberle,  William D.  "Comments on  the  Report,"  Policy Perspectives for Inter-
national' Trade and Economic Relations,  Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion  and  Development,  Paris,  September 5,  1972,  page  116. 
23.  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Centrafrican  Republic,  Democratic  Republic  of  the 
Congo,  Ivory  Coast,  Dahomey,  Gabon,  Voltaic  Republic,  Madagascar,  Mali, 
Mauritania,  Niger,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Somalia,  Chad,  Togo,  Zaire,  Kenya, 
Uganda,  Tanzania,  and  Mauritius. 
24.  Botswana,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Nigeria,  Sierro Leone, 
Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia,  Fiji,  Tonga,  Western  Samoa,  Barba-
dos,  Guyana, Jamaica,  Trinidad,  and  Tobago. 
25.  Iceland, Sweden. ·Finland,  Portugal,  Switzerland,  Austria,  Norway. 
17 not  been  continued  with  the  new  Community,  these  African 
nations,  most  of  them  poor  and  wracked  by  the  birthpains  of 
nationhood,  would  have  been  dealt  a  severe  and  possibly  fatal 
economic  blow.  Their agreements  with  the  Community  envisage 
freeing  two-way  trade  between  the  Community  and  the  nations 
concerned. The  Community contends, although the United States 
has  not conceded  the  point,  that the  agreements  meet  the  con-
ditions for the creation of free trade areas as sanctioned by Article 
XXIV of the GATT. 
The  agreements  with  Britain's  EFTA  partners  were  signed  to 
prevent the  reimposition of tariff barriers.  Any  damage to a third 
country's trade will  be  repaired  by negotiations within  the GATT 
for compensatory treatment. 
•  European  candidates.  The  second  group of agreements was 
concluded  with  European  nations  which  hope  to  become  full 
members of the Community some  day but which cannot now take 
on  the  economic  and  political  obligations  of  full  membership. 
Greece,  Turkey,  and  Spain  fall  into  this  category.  The  Turkish 
economy cannot yet withstand  the  full  force of free  competition 
inside the  Common  Market,  while Spain  and  Greece  suffer from 
both economic and political disabilities. 
All these nations traditionally have  had  close ties with the  rest 
of Europe.  The  Community  has  taken  the  view  that  it  would  be 
economically unfair to them,  and politically contrary to the  Euro-
pean spirit of the Rome Treaty, to shut them out, particularly since 
· in time they may aspire to full membership. Furthermore the  Com-
munity  contends  that  the  agreement  with  these  countries  hew 
closely enough to the GATT specifications for customs unions and 
free  trade  associations to  be  considered consistent  with  interna-
tional obligations. 
•  Associates'  competitors.  The  final  group  of  countries  are 
Mediterranean and African nations which have sought association 
with  the  Community  because  their  exports  to  Western  Europe 
traditionally compete with those from  other associated  countries; 
hence they would  be  severely  affected  if excluded.  Questions of 
political impartiality also arise.  Examples are  Egypt and  Israel. 
TRADE  COMPLEMENTS  AID 
In  European  eyes,  these  special  economic  arrangements  by the 
Community with countries which conduct a major portion of their 
trade with the European Community and which are, in many cases, 
either  contiguous  European  nations  or  former  dependencies  of 
members,  are  comparable  to  the  special economic  relations  be-
tween  the  United  States  and  Canada-notably  the  US-Canadian 
18 automobile  agreement,  under  which  the  two  countries  conduct 
almost a third of their trade duty-free. 
The preferential trade agreements with developing African coun-
tries parallel and complement the substantial capital and technical 
assistance being supplied to them by the Community. This is part 
of the joint aid  effort to developing countries-coordinated  by  the 
OECD's  Development  Assistance  Committee.  The  developing 
countries  themselves  consider  these  agreements  a  satisfactory 
way of ordering relations with the  developed world, or they would 
not choose them. 
For a determination of whether these  diverse agreements com-
ply with GATT  rules governing free trade areas or customs unions, 
Brussels  has submitted them  to the  GATT signatories.  So  far,  no 
agreement  concluded by  the  Community  has  been  contested  by 
the  majority of GATT  members. 
US  FEARS  EXAGGERATED 
Fears that  US  exports would  suffer as  a  result of discrimination 
against them  under the EC's preferential agreements seem  exag-
gerated  when  measured  against  the  facts.  US  exports  to  the 
Community's  original  18  Yaounde  associates  traditionally  have 
been  small.  In  1971  they  amounted  to  only $190.1  million,  com-
pared to Community exports of $1.4 billion. In addition, US exports 
to  these  18  states  have  grown three times faster  than  the  Com-
munity's  exports  to  those  countries  in  the  14  years  since  its 
founding.  The  evidence  suggests  that  these  former . colonies, 
whose  markets  used  to  be  virtually  closed  to  outsiders,  have 
liberalized trade policies toward the  United States and  the world 
since  their association  with  the Common  Market. 
Under GATT  rules  for free  trade  areas,  EC  associates remain 
free  to  lower their  duties  on  imports  from  the  United  States  or 
other non-EC countries without impairing their EC  preferences.  In 
March  1970  Cameroon,  Gabon,  Congo-Brazzaville,  and  the  Cen-
trafrican Republic  (which  make up  the  Central  African  Economic 
and Customs  Union)  slashed their duties across the  board  by 50 
per cent.  The  Ivory Coast recently  lowered its tariffs substantially 
on  cars, tractors, and air conditioners, three important US exports. 
The  same  GATT  rules  also  say  that  all  members  of  a  free 
trade area must make concessions. The associates consider these 
"reverse preferences,"  their concessions  on  Community  exports, 
one  of their best bargaining tools  in  negotiations with  industrial-
ized  nations.  As  reverse  preferences are  negotiable,  protests  by 
industrialized nations suggest only one  explanation: 
"The question  of  'reverse  preferences'  is  a  false  issue  which 
19 has  been  raised  by third countries,  more  often  by  industrialized 
nations which are seeking from the associated countries the same 
advantages as those given to the  Community without at the same 
time offering  them  reciprocity ....  "26 
For countries like Greece, associated with the Community in  a 
customs union, the situation parallels the  one of the Community's 
enlargement.  The  area  of  discrimination  against  US  exports 
widens, but the degree of protection drops as the associate lowers 
tariffs  to  the  generally  low  average  level  of  the  EC's  common 
external  tariff.  As  happened  at  the  Common  Market's  creation, 
broadening  the  market is  also  likely to  stimulate trade. 
Where US complaints of export damage from preferential agree-
ments  prove  justified,  the  Community  makes  adjustments.  This 
was the case  in the "citrus war" which the  Community ended  by 
making  unilateral  tariff concessions  on  citrus  imports from  June 
through September,  California's peak  growing  season.  Since  the 
Mediterranean  season  ends  in  May,  the  Community  could  make 
this adjustment without harming Spanish  and  Israeli exports. 
EC  GENERALIZED  PREFERENCES  ALSO  AID 
The Community's preferential agreements did not prevent it from 
becoming the first trading power to  enact a system of generalized 
preferences, granting all developing countries tariff advantages on 
their industrial exports. The US  delay in  following the  lead of the 
Community  and  Japan  is  another  current  source  of  friction  in 
US-Community relations.  EC  associates  had  agreed  to  a  dilution 
of their  preferential  access  to  the  Community  market  with  the 
understanding  that  every  other trading  power  would  follow  the 
Community's example, thus widening the associates' export possi-
bilities.  Most  powers  have;  but  in  the  major  American  market, 
nothing  has  been  done,  with  dim  prospects  of  any  action  early 
in 1973. 
In  protracted negotiations with the  developing  countries in  the 
United Nations Conference _on  Trade and  Development (UNCTAD) 
and  within the  OECD,  Washington  and  Brussels  had  engaged  in 
an  Indian wrestling match.  First Washington opposed any plan  at 
all.  Later,  battle  revolved  around  the  elimination  of  the  Commu-
nity's  preferential  agreements  and  the  British . Commonwealth 
arrangements  after  a  worldwide system  had  been  put  in  place. 
Still later, the argument focused on the shape of the plan, whether 
to exclude "sensitive" p·roducts,  set quotas, or write in  safeguard 
clauses.  Finally,  it was  agreed  that  each  developed  country  or 
trading bloc would apply the preference system of its choice. The 
26.-- i3ertholn,  George.  Address before  the  Federation  of  Commonwealth  Cham-
bers of  Commerce,  London,  June  8,  1972. 
20 OECD  is to determine whether the different systems resulted in an 
even  sharing  of  the  "burden"  of  imports  from  the  developing 
countries. 
The  idea  for  the  industrialized  countries  to  grant  generalized 
tariff preferences to developing countries. is  based  on  the  theory 
that  between  unequal  trading  partners,  equality  oppresses  while 
unequal  treatment  restores  justice.  Tariff  preferences  involve 
giving  up  all  or part  of the  customs  duties  levied  on  goods  im-
ported from  specific countries.  These  preferences are  not  recip-
rocal,  since  the  beneficiaries  do  not  have  to  reduce  their  own 
non-discriminatory as they are granted to  all  developing countries 
and  generalized because they are to be  granted by all developed 
countries. 
The  proposed  US  system  would  offer  duty-free  entry  to  the 
US  market for all  manufactured  and  semi-manufactured  products 
of any qualified developing country. The only exceptions would be 
textiles,  shoes,  and  petroleum  products,  precisely  the  sort  of 
pr9ducts  most  developing  countries  can  best  produce  competi-
tively. Duty-free access also could be withdrawn under an escape 
clause if it were found that it was resulting in injury to a domestic 
industry. 
HOW  EC  SYSTEM  WORKS 
The  Community put its generalized preference plan  into effect on 
July 1,  1971. It provides for duty-free entry of all manufactures and 
semimanufactures,  originally, fro.m  the  91  members of UNCTAD's 
"Group  of 77."  At  the  request  of  several  countries27  which  did 
not belong to the  Group of  77~ the Community decided to  expand 
its list of beneficiaries on  January 1,  1973. 
The Community system distinguishes between agricultural prod-
ucts and semimanufactured goods. 
•  Processed  agricultural  goods.  Tariff  benefits  are  granted  on 
about  150  processed  agricultural  products  (Chapters  1 to  24  of 
the Brussels Nomenclature)  imported  from  the  developing  coun-
tries,  valued  at  about $30  million.  Preferences  consist  of  partial 
reduction  in  customs duties  or levies,  and imports  are  admitted 
without volume limits. 
A safeguard clause, based  on  Article XXIX  of the  GATT,  allows 
partial  or  complete  reimposition  of  the  duty  or  levy  when  the 
import's quantity or  price  seriously  jeopardizes Community  pro-
duction.  It  applies only  to  the  country or countries  causing  the 
damage, thus protecting non-offending  exporters. 
27.  Cuba,  Bhutan.  Fiji,  Bangladesh,  the  Persian  Gulf  states.  Oman,  SiKKtm, 
Nauru,  Western  Samoa,  and  Tonga. 
21 •  Industrial products.  Industrial  raw  materials  (Chapters  25  to 
99  of  the  Brussels  Nomenclature)  are  not covered  by  the  Com-
munity  system;  but  almost  all  imported  industrial  raw  materials 
already  entered  the  Community  countries  duty-free,  iii  pre-EC 
times. 
The Community system for manufactured and semimanufactured 
goods has  three  features:  a  ceiling system,  duty-exemption,  and 
no exclusions. The ceiling system limiting the volume of preferen-
tial  imports is counter-balanced  by  duty-exemption, the  fact  that 
no  goods are shut out,  and  the lack of a  safeguard  clause.  The 
first annual  ceilings amounted to  more than  twice the value of its 
imports from the Third World in 1968, the  base  year.  In  practice, 
the ceilings are  applied only to sensitive products.  To give every 
developing country a chance to sell  in  the  Community market,  no 
exporter may supply more than 50  per cent of the ceiling for most 
products, but 30 per cent or 20  per cent for some. 
Washington  claims that its system,  without any  ceilings,  would 
be  more generous.  Brussels  retorts  that  US  exceptions plus the 
handy escape clause would be  more restrictive than the Common 
Market's tariff quota. Time  alone  will tell  who is right,  if the  US 
Congress ever approves global preferences. 
EXPANDED  COMMUNITY'S  RESPONSIBILITIES 
This short  inventory of  the  Community's efforts at  "burden shar-
ing" should  quiet  some  allegations that the  Community  twiddles 
its collective thumbs  while the  United  States feeds,  clothes,  and 
defends the entire free world. 
Even though the Community is  proud of its record,  it is the first 
to admit that there is always room  for improvement.  Its patchwork 
of agreements in the Mediterranean area are  being studied in the 
hopes  of finding  a  way  to  treat  every  country  fairly.  Its  and  its 
members' aid  policies are  being sifted  in  the hopes of improving 
the effectiveness of its economic aid. The expanded Community is 
"determined  to  make  the  process  of  unification  irreversible  in 
order to  consolidate  [its]  friendships,  in  order  to contribute  de-
cisively, on  a footing  of equality,  to  the  development of the  less 
favored  nations,  and  in  order  to  develop,  as  a  new  element  of 
equilibrium  in  a better international  order,  new cooperative  rela-
tionships with  all  the  peoples of  the  earth." 2s 
28.  Malfatti,  Franco  Maria.  Speech  at  the  Signing  of  the  Acts  of  Accessi6n, 
Brussels.  January 22,  1972. 
22 The  United  States  and  the  European  Commt,mity  have  a  vital 
mutual  interest in  keeping  minor trade differences in  perspective 
while awaiting the global negotiations of 1973.  Am~rican anxieties 
abo!Jt the Common Market's expansion center on fears for Ameri-
can  farm  exports.  There  is  some  worry,  too,  about  the  possible 
effects on  US  exports of manufactured goods.  The figures should 
speak for themselves  (see  Table  on  page  24). 
Viewed  from  the  perspective  of  the  economist,  many  of  the 
accusations hurled  across the  Atlantic in  the past  few years are 
nee-mercantilist,  based  on  the  ancient  fallacy  that  exports  are 
good, imports bad. A former member of President Nixon's Council 
of Economic Advisers spoke for the  economists when  he  said: 
"There is no  neec;l  to export merely to  provide employment or 
23 US  TRADE  WITH  THE  COMMUNITY  (1971) 
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to grow. Conversely, the fear of imports because they might create 
unemployment can  easily  be  exaggerated,  though  it  is  true  that 
large  increases in  imports may  cause  transitional  problems with 
which global economic policies cannot deal  sufficiently promptly. 
These problems can  be  eased by adjustment assistance .... 
"Another legitimate concern about imports is that in some cases 
a country may not wish  to  become too heavily reliant on foreign 
supply  in  a  particular  industry  because  this  might  threaten  its 
national  security.  However,  the  security  argument  needs  to  be 
supported by careful analysis to  be  convincing, since otherwise a 
country may  pay  too high  a  price for freedom  from  supply inter- . 
ruptions that may themselves be unlikely to occur." 
Seen  this  way,  the  question  of  who  has  the  slyest  non-tariff 
barriers  to  trade  or  export  subsidies  is  of  secondary  interest. 
He added: 
"From  the  point of view  of  economic  analysis,  this  reciprocal 
procedure  [of  trying  to  balance  trade  concessions]  is  open  to 
question, since obstacles to  trade  may  be  at  least as  harmful to 
the  potential  importer as  to  the  potential  exporter."  29 
Unfortunately,  economics is foreign to some  pqliticians writing 
trade  laws  in  the  US  Congress  and  their  opposite  numbers  in 
European  legislatures.  Often  the  short-term  interests of powerful 
constituents seem  more  urgent than  the  prescriptions  of  econo-
mists  and  statesmen  for  the  long-term  health  of  the  nation,  or 
even  of  the  industries  seeking  protection  from  imports.  If  the 
United·States has so  far followed a generally liberal trade policy, 
it is  because  the  majority of Congressmen  have  considered  the 
facts and shown concern for the  national interest. Seen  from this 
political angle, the facts behind the economic issues now straining 
US  relations with  the  European Community should  be  examined, 
in the hopes of reducing their political camouflage value. 
29:  Houthhaker,  Hendrik  S.  Address  at  American  University,  Washington,  DC, 
March  25,  1970. 
24 MYTHS  IN  VOGUE 
A  number of assumptions now color relations between the Com-
munity  and  the  United  States.  Upon  examination  they  prove  to 
have  little basis in  fact. They are: 
•  The common agricultural policy shuts out US farm exports. 
•  Imports threaten  a  number  of  important  US  industries  with 
injury or ruin, with a consequent disastrous loss of jobs. Textiles, 
shoes,  steel,  and  consumer  electronics  are  the  industries  most 
often cited. 
•  Many US products can no longer compete in world markets. 
•  The US  balance of payments deficit is due to its trade deficit. 
•  The  United States is the "most open" or "last open" market 
in  the world, and the contrast sharpens as  other trading  nations 
heap up non-tariff barriers against US  products. 
•  Successive US  administrations played the  role  of the  benefi-
cent uncle and failed to obtain concessions in postwar bargaining 
to reduce tariffs. 
Even the  previously liberal  AFL-CIO,  disappointed at the effec-
tiveness  of  adjustment  assistance  and  alarmed  at  the  growing 
power of the  multinational  company,  has  taken  up the  cudgels. 
Commented one union official: 
"Adjustment assistance was  designed as  a stopgap for a small 
group of workers  adversely  affected  by  foreign  competition,  not 
for the  critical  onslaught we  are  suffering in  which  whole indus-
tries are being wiped out,  often at the hand of the American cor-
porations themselves .... How can a  stricken· area  adjust when 
the firm is gone ....  "30 
The  currency  which  these  beliefs  have  gained  is  dramatized 
when  echoed  by such  sober and  knowledgeable  men  as  Repre-
sentative  Wilbur  D.  Mills  (D-Ark.),  chairman  of the  House  Ways 
and  Means  Committee.  His  comments  during  a  recent  interview 
by  the  German  weekly  news  magazine  Der  Spiegel  electrified 
Europeans: 
"I would  like  a  commercial  policy which  equitably  takes  into 
account US  interests which it doesn't do today.  I want to  protect 
American industry against every  import that damages it,  jeopard-
izes it, or threatens to destroy it. ... Almost every industrial sector 
is affected .... Free trade is utopia; it exists nowhere in the world  . 
.  . . The  American  people  now  demand  equitable treatment.  We 
will do nothing more without being assured of reciprocity." Never-
theless,  he  roundly  condemned  the  protectionist  Hartke-Burke 
30.  Beimiller, Andrew J.  Statement before the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  Hearing  on  Adjustment  Assist-
ance,  April  25,  1972. 
25 trade  and  tax  bill:  "Such  a  law  would  have  disastrous  conse-
quences,"  31  he  said. 
COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY:  ONE  FOR  NINE 
The  Community's farm  policy  replaces  the former  nine  separate 
agricultural policies of the  member  nations with a  single policy. 
This  consolidation  should  speed  the  forthcoming  GATT  negotia-
tions where both  the  Community and  the  United States  will have 
some tough concessions to make. The common agricultural policy 
(CAP)  was  designed  to  open  up  agricultural  frade  among  the 
member states and to increase the efficiency of Community farming 
without making the farmers helpless victims of agrarian reform. 
The first and last of these aims have l;leen put into practice. The 
customs union has freed  trade inside the Common  Market; Com-
munity  farmers,  mostly  tilling  small  holdings,  receive  protection 
and guaranteed minimum prices. 
The second has just begun.  Dubbed the Mansholt Plan after the 
Commissi9n  Vice  President  who  developed it,  Sicco  L.  Mansholt 
(later Commission President), it is an attempt to bring about radical 
changes in the structure of Community agriculture. Its main thrust 
is to accelerate the already rapid decline in the number of people 
engaged  in farming in  the Community. A  labor-short area such  as 
the Community cannot afford to employ 13  workers out of 100  in 
agriculture when only 4.5  per cent of the US  labor force works in 
farming.  In  the  first  five  years  of  the  plan,  the  Community  will 
spend  $900  million  to  help  farmers  modernize  and  enlarge their 
holdings, to retrain farm workers for jobs in  other industries, and 
to  pay  older farmers  retirement pensions. 
HOW  CAP  WORKS 
The Common  Market imposes a levy on many  imported  products 
that compete with  Community  farm  products.  The  amount of the 
levy varies to  raise the  price of imported products to the  market 
price guaranteed inside the Community.  In  many cases,  the inter-
nal  price  level  is  substantially  higher  (as  is  the  case  for  wheat) 
than  the  price  of  imported  products.  The  levy  protects the  rela-
. fively  inefficient  Common  Market  farmer.  The  receipts  are  paid 
into the  Community's common farm  fund.  The  proceeds are  used 
to  reimburse  governments for the cost of intervening  in  the  food 
market to  hold  prices at guaranteed minimum  levels and  to sup-
port certain Community farm  exports to enable them  to  compete 
31.  Mills,  Will?ur  D.  Der  Spiegel  interview,  No.  38-1972,  Hamburg,  September 
10,  1972. 
26 in  world markets. The fund  is also  used  to finance modernization. 
At  times  of  monetary  instability,  compensatory  levies,  set  in 
units  of  account,  are  also  imposed  at  the  borders  to  stabilize 
prices. This adjustment compensates for changes in the values of 
. the  Community members' currencies to each  other.  If  no  adjust-
ment were made, when the value of the German mark, for example, 
rose,  Germany could  import a  product more cheaply  than  could 
another member country whose  currency had  not appreciated. 
This  practice caused  some  friction  between  the  United States 
and  the  Community early in  1972.  The  dispute was partly settled 
after  the  Common  Market  agreed  to  waive  the  levy  for  most 
products covered by special agreements within the GATT,  includ-
ing soybeans, a major US  export. 
CAP:  US  BETE  NOIRE 
The  CAP  has  incurred  the  wrath  of  American  Administrations 
since  its  completion  in  the  mid-Sixties.  US. complaints  are  best 
summarized  in the  "white paper" of December 1971: 
" ... the Community has developed an agricultural policy which 
satisfies the political needs of their agrisectors at the expense of 
its own  consumers  and  outsiders.  This system,  based upon  very 
high support prices, is designed to limit other non-member nations 
to the role of residual suppliers ....  Since the domestic surpluses 
are priced too high for world competition, aggressive subsidization 
·is used to push the surpluses into the traditional markets of other 
more efficient suppliers."  32 
Relative  support  levels  are  difficult to  gauge,  but the  US  1973 
budget foresees  farm subsidies of $6.98 billion,33 as compared with 
a $3  billion  support  allocation  in  the  Community  budget. There 
are  indications  that  the  US  agricultural  subsidies  have  soared 
in  relation  to  the  Community's  since  1968  when  a  Community 
study  estimated  that  US  farm  income would  decline by  44  per -
cent,  and Community  farm  income  by  50  per  cent,  if  agricultural 
supports were withdrawn.34 
There  is some  basis for  concern about the  impact of the  CAP 
upon  American  farm  exports,  but  the  facts  do  not  support  the 
extreme charges  against  it. 
32.  Peterson,  Peter  G.  Foreign  Economic  Perspectives,  The  White  House,  De-
cember 30,  1971,  pages  21-22. 
33.  Melloan,  George.  "Time  to  Phase  Out  Farm  Subsidies?"  The  Wall  Street 
Journal,  May 4,  1972. 
34.  "Comparison  of  Agricultural  Support  Systems  in  the  United  States  and  the 
Community,''  Commission  of the  European  Communities,  Brussels.  January 
1971. 
27 EC  STILL  US  FARMERS'  BEST  CUSTOMER 
The Community remains by far the best market for US farm  prod-
ucts. US exports to the Common Market rose by 66 per cent during 
the first decade of its existence, compared to a 62  per cent growth 
rate· In  US  farm  exports woridwide.  According to US  Department 
of  Agriculture  statistics,  in  1971  the  Community's  imports  of 
American farm  products amounted to $1.8  billion, a 15.5 per cent 
annual increase. 
According to the same  source,  in  one area alone,  fats  and oils 
exports, the United States has increased its sales to the Commu-
nity fr9m $95.8 million in 1958 to $838.7 million in 1971, due mainly 
to the  CAP's encouragement of animal  husbandry and  dairy pro-
duction.  These  sales  have,  in  fact,  tended  to  offset losses  in  US 
grain exports to the Common  Market. 
In  1964,  the  last  full  trade  year  before  the  beginning  of  the 
introduction  of  the  CAP,  US  farm  exports  amounted  to  $1.23 
billion,  according to  Community  figures.  By  1971  these  exports 
had  risen to $1:75 billion. In  the past seven years,  US  agricultural 
exports to the Community have risen by 42 per cent, while increas-
ing only 26 per cent to the rest of the world. The US  share of the 
Community's farm  import market has remained  stable,  except for 
an  increase in  1971.  In  1958 the Community bought 21.3  per cent 
of  US  farm  exports,  21.7  per  cent  in  1964,  and  24.5  per  cent 
in 1971. 
Thus,  it  is  hard  to  pin  the  major blame  for the  stagnation  of 
American farm exports on the CAP.  US  agricultural exports to the 
world have been stagnating since 1964. The basic reasons are that 
food  consumption has  not  risen  in  economically advanced  coun-
tries,  while the  "green  revolution,'_'  not only  in  developing  lands 
but also in Western Europe and Japan, has led to a quantum jump 
in world production. Worldwide agricultural productivity has been 
iQcreasing by about 7 per cent a year while consumption has grown 
by  less  than  3  per cent.  Increased  self-sufficiency  in  traditional 
deficit areas and  sharper price competition in  world markets are 
the  results.  Another  brake  on  US  farm  exports  has  been  the 
progressive reduction of US  subsidies to food exports to develop-
ing countries under Public Law 480 and other aid programs. These 
aids  have  declined from  $1.7  billion  in  1965  to  about  $1  billion 
in 1970. 
The last major concern over the CAP often voiced in the United 
States  is that  British  entry  into  the  Common  Market  will  further 
damage  American  farm  exports  by.  extending  the  CAP  to  the 
largest food importing nation in  the world. Soon the evidence will 
start  coming  in,  but  a  contrary  view  has  been  expressed  by  a 
28 former Secretary General of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
"The  impact  of  British  entry  on  US  farm  exports  has  been 
greatly exaggerated.  In  fact,  there  is only one  major US  agricul-
tural product, feed grains, which benefits from a higher protection 
in  the  EEC  than  it does  presently  in  Britain.  On  such  important 
US export items as soybeans, oil cakes, vegetable oils, dried fruits, 
and  vegetables,  the  level  of  EEC  protection  is  either  lower  or 
about the same as that of Britain. In the case of tobacco, which is 
the most important single agricultural product exported to Britain, 
accounting for about two~fifths of total US farm exports, total tariff 
and  excise charges are  higher in  Britain than  in the  Community. 
Considering  these  factors,  it  is  by  no  means  excluded  that  US 
farm exports to  Britain which have been stagnating at about $400 
million  during  the  last  six  years  may  be  stimulated  as  a  conse-
quence of Britain's joining the  EEC."35 
The  fact  is  that the  complexity  of  the  factors  directly and  in-
directly involved make prediction extremely difficult. At face value, 
however,  the figures do not suggest that the United  States would 
suffer a severe  loss of farm exports as a result of Britain's acces-
sion to the Community.  Indeed, there is soma reason to hope that 
Britain, whose interests in keeping food prices down coincide with 
US  export interests,  will  succeed  in  negotiating  a  lower  level  of 
CAP  price supports.  If British entry should  lead  to a lowering  of 
CAP price supports for the Community as a whole; the  net impact 
could be a healthy plus for US farm exports. 
CAP:  A  FACT  OF  LIFE  FOR  FORESEEABLE  FUTURE 
In  any case,  the CAP,  in some form,  is  a  fact of life for the fore-
seeable future. Forging a common agricultural policy was essential 
to the creation of the Common  Market.  It was  the minimum  price 
demanded  by  France,  the  most  efficient  farm  producer  of  the 
Six,  for  exposing  French  industry  to  the  full  force  of  German 
competition. 
The underlying concept of the CAP from the first was inherently 
and necessarily discriminatory against farm products from outside 
the  Common  Market.  It also was tilted against  major Community 
food  importers  like  Germany  and  Italy,  whose  customs  receipts 
from  import  levies  far  exceed  those  of  the  exporting  countries, 
notably  France  .. An  offsetting  factor,  though  difficult to  measure, 
is the extent to which higher levels of consumption of farm  prod-
ucts, including imported goods, have been generated by the higher 
rate of growth since the  formation of the Common Market. 
35.  Op.  cit.  supra at  11. 
29 In  the  immediate  future,  the  Community's trading  partners can 
legitimately seek  to  persuade  Brussels  to  operate  the  CAP  in  a 
way that minimizes disruption of world farm  trade.  In negotiations 
with the United States in the winter of 1972, the Community proved 
its willingness to make adjustments whenever feasible by reducing 
its citrus fruit tariffs and  agreeing to  increase  its wheat stockpile. 
Looking  farther  ahead,  there  is  much  evidence  that the  Com-
munity's farm  policy will  be  progressively  liberalized  and  its  im-
port barriers lowered. The member governments of the Community 
and its Commission are painfully aware of the heavy financial cost 
of the CAP as now operated and pressures for reform are building. 
In the long term, the Community's farm reform plan should make 
it increasingly easier, politically, to pursue an  economically realis-
tic  farm  policy.  But  revolutionary  social  changes take  time.  The 
United  States  had  its first  experience with  agricultural  surpluses 
as far back as  the early Twenties.  Fifty years later it still  looks to 
its  large  food  aid  program  under Public  Law  480  to  reduce  the 
agricultural surplus,  not to  mention  mammoth,  heavily subsidized 
grain cleals  with occasional buyers such as the Soviet Union  and 
China. 
US  INDUSTRY  CAN  COMPETE 
In the  industrial arena, a close look at  the  popular underpinnings 
of the  protectionists' argument may  prove  worthwhile. 
Of the assertion concerning the weak US position in world trade, 
there  is  much  evidence  that  the  reasons  for  the  decline  in  the 
US trade surplus from $3.6 billion in the mid-Sixties to a deficit of 
$1.5  billion  in  1971  lie  more  in  domestic inflation than  in  a  loss 
of competitiveness. 
Many  US  industries  have  put  in  a  strong· export  performance 
right  along.  More  than  a  score  have  racked  up  continuous  in-
creases  every  year  since 1960.  They  include  cars  and  trucks 
and parts with exports of $4.1  billion in 1971,  up  more than 138 per 
cent  since  1965;  electronic  computers  and  parts  $1.1  billion,  a 
gain  of  343  per  cent  since  1965,  and  chemicals  $3.8  billion,  up 
58  per cent since 1965. 
The General Counsel of the protectionist Trade Relations Coun-
cil of the  United States conceded that  in  1967  a group of 185  US 
industries, accounting  for  about 40  per cent  of  total  employment 
in  manufacturing industries and  for 56  per cent of  the  total value 
of shipments, scored a $10.4  billion trade surplus that year.36 
36.  Stewart.  Eugene  L.  Testimony  before  the  Joint Economic  Committee  of  the 
US  Congress.  March_ 18,  1970. 
30 US  QUOTAS  KILL  US  JOBS 
However,  a visiting  scholar at  the Brookings Institution  has  esti-
mated that import restrictions would "reduce US jobs, because its 
exports are more  labor intensive than  its imports." He  explained: 
"Under  its  international  legal  obligations,  the  United  States 
would  be  required  to  negotiate  tariff concessions to compensate 
countries for the losses caused them by any new US  quotas. This 
would  increase  US  imports of other  commodities by  an  amount 
equal to the reduction in imports triggered by the  new quotas, and 
offset  any  reduction  in  unemployment which  they  achieved .... 
The  United States would not be  able to offer compensation,  how-
ever,  because virtually all  dutiable  items would  be  controlled  by 
the quotas. Other countries would thus be free to retaliate against 
US exports, by an amount equal to the cutback in US  imports, and 
we  can  be  sure  that  they  would.  This  in  turn  would  reduce  US 
jobs ....  "37 
As to claims of import damage, the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic  Policy  recently  con-
cluded: 
"Textile firms 9nd  workers in  the Northeast were  probably hurt 
far more by the  internal relocation of their industry to the  South 
than by  imports from  the  Far  East.  Similarly, the  aerospace engi-
neer  in  California now driving a taxicab can  attribute his misfor-
tune to  diminution of the  US  space  program,  not construction  of 
the Anglo-French Concorde.JB 
George P.  Shultz, former Labor Secretary now Secretary of the 
Treasury,  calculated  that  2.7  million American workers were em-
ployed  directly and  indirectly in producing goods shipped  out  of 
the  country.  In  addition,  some  hundreds of thousands  of people 
are employed  in  processing and  handling  imported  goods. 
On  the  import side,  he  estimated  that  it would  have taken  2.5 
million additional workers to produce all  the goods imported into 
the  United  States  in  1969.  It would have  been  difficult or impos-
sible to find the skilled people to do so.  There would have been a 
sharp rise in  inflation and  a net  loss in  the  US  standard  of living 
and  in  exports.39 
37.  Bergsten,  C.  Fred.  "The Costs  and  Benefits  to  the  United  States  of  Trade 
Adjustment  Assistance,"  Statement  before  the House  Foreign  Affairs  Com-
mittee,  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  April  25,  1972. 
38.  "Trade  Adjustment  Assistance,"  Report,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  August  29,  1972,  page  3. 
39.  Shultz.  George  P.,  Testimony  before  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  of 
the  US  House of  Representatives,  March 13,  1970. 
31 Historically, the Brookings economist reported,  "unemployment 
and the trade surplus usually decline together in the United States. 
This is because the rapid  growth which provides jobs also sucks 
in  imports, and generates price increases which hurt our interna-
tional competitiveness. "40 
US  MARKET  BRISTLES  WITH  BARRIERS 
The claim that the United States is the world's last or even "most" 
open  market  is  hard  to  substantiate.  Certainly  with  more  than 
20  per cent of  US  imports by value  now  controlled  by  voluntary 
or mandatory quotas and the US market hedged with as formidable 
a ring of non-tariff barriers as  most other trading powers have, it is 
hard to see  how the  United States could be  termed the  last· open 
market. The  United States maintains quotas or similar devices on 
cotton textiles, steel, wool, meat,  petroleum, sugar, cotton, wheat, 
dairy products, ceramic tiles,  and  other products.  It is true,  how-
ever, that the United States imposes fewer quotas on  imports from 
Japan than does Western  Europe. 
The US  tariff level on  industrial  products is substantially higher 
than the Community's on average. Also, the Common Market coun-
tries' efforts to harmonize tariffs on trade between themselves have 
resulted  in  a  common  tariff  of  more  uniform  level  than  the  US 
tariff. The peaks in the US tariff schedules are much  more restric-
tive than  the  more evenly distributed EC  duties. 
NTB'S:  POT  CALLS  THE  KETTLE  BLACK 
American politicians and businessmen frequently accuse the Euro-
pean  Community  of  erecting  a  bristling  wall  of  new  non-tariff 
barriers (NTB's)  to  imports to  replace  the  tariffs  reduced  in  the 
Kennedy Round.  This picture is  distorted. 
AVERAGE  POST-KENNEDY  ROUND  TARIFFS 
(percentages) 
Community 
United States 
United  Kingdom 
Japan 
Raw 
Materials 
0.6 
3.8 
1.2 
5.5 
Semi-mfd. 
6.2 
8.3 
8.3 
9.3 
Finished 
mfd. 
8.7 
8.1 
10.4 
12.0 
Industrial 
Average 
6.0 
7.1 
7.6 
9.7 
Source:  Tariff  Study  by 
Trade,  1971. 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
40.  Op.  cit.  at  36  supra. 
32 In the first place, all countries have rules or policies, in addition 
to customs  duties,  which  may  restrict  imports  or  favor  exports. 
Generally, they have been adopted for domestic reasons and only 
inadvertently affect international trade.  Non-tariff barriers to trade 
range from import quotas to customs valuation procedures, public 
procurement policies, border tax adjustments, antidumping regula-
tions,  technical  and  health  regulations,  export subsidies,  and  so 
on. A GATT working party has catalogued more than 800  non-tariff 
barriers of its members which may restrict trade. The United States 
has its full share of NTB's. 
An  analysis  of  the  Community  members'  non-tariff  barriers 
would exceed the scope of this paper.  It should  merely be  noted 
that none of these  governments intends to  indulge in  an  orgy of 
new  non-tariff barrier building,  assuming  that  international  trade 
war can be  averted. 
The  relevant  question  is  what,  if any,  new  trade  barriers  the 
Community may have· built as  a by-product of its evolution. Aside 
from the common  agricultural  policy already discussed,  only one 
major problem has arisen so far: border tax adjustments.  The US 
Government has been actively concerned with the possible impact 
of the EC  nations' tax systems on US trade since January 1, 1968, 
when Germany  replaced  its "cascade···  tax system  with the Com-
munity's value  added  turnover  tax  (VAT).  The  German  move  fol-
lowed a 1964 decision by the EC Council of Ministers to harmonize 
members'  turnover  tax  systems,  using  the  French  system  as  a 
model. All the old members but Italy have  made the  changeover, 
and  Italy plans  to  do ·so early  next year.  Of  the  new  members, 
Denmark and Ireland have VAT on the Community model,  and the 
United Kingdom will introduce it next year. 
UNITED  STATES  MAY  COPY  VAT 
The VAT, a sales tax collected each time a product is sold, differs 
from  other  sales  taxes  in  that  it  is  imposed  only  on  the  value 
added to the  product by the seller.  Its effect is identical to that of 
a retail sales tax. The main difference is that the government gets 
part of the tax eventually paid  by the consumer at every stage of 
production. This system lessens the chances of tax evasion. 
The Americans complain about the tax adjustment at the border 
under the VAT,  albeit less vociferously since  they  began  to think 
about  levying a VAT of their own.  They maintain that this adjust-
ment is  the  equivalent  of a  tariff  barrier  and  illegal  under  inter-
national  trading  rules. 
The Europeans insist that the border tax adjustment for VAT is 
neutral  in effect and,  furthermore, essential. They ooint out that it 
33 would be  unfair for an  imported machine tool to enter a Common 
Market country and  be  sold tax-free while a comparable domesti-
cally produced tool was taxed. They point out, too, that the. United 
States  taxes imported automobiles  in  the  same way,  both  at  the 
federal  and  local  levels,  and  that  local  retail  sales  taxes  in  the 
United States are often as  high as  6 per cent over and above any 
federal excise taxes. 
The  rules of the GATT recognize the  legitimacy of adjustments 
at the border for indirect or sales taxes.  By contrast, they do not 
permit signatory nations to  compensate similarly for direct taxes 
on income. This distinction is based on  the theory that sales taxes 
are passed on to the consumer in  the form of higher prices while 
income taxes are absorbed by the manufacturer. 
The US  Government has argued against the Community's move 
to  a  single  VAT  system  on  two  grounds.  First,  it  protested  that 
the change, particularly by Germany, was equivalent to a disguised 
exchange  rate  devaluation  of  perhaps  2  per cent  to  3  per cent 
which damaged US  exports and  impaired its Kennedy Round tariff 
gains at a time  when  the US  balance of payments was in  deficit 
and  Germany's. in  surplus. 
Washington  has  maintained that the  GATT  distinction  between 
border adjustments for indirect but not for direct taxes is  invalid, 
since not all  the  burden of 'sales taxes  is  passed  on to  the con-
sumer nor does the manufacturer absorb all the burden of income 
taxes.  On  the  basis  of  that  contention,  the  United  States  has 
sought changes in  the GATT  rules  to  either permit partial  border 
compensation for direct taxes or moderate the  impact of VAT on 
imports and  exports.  The  US  case  has  been  weakened  by  the 
impossibility of proving this contention, and  so  far the GATT has 
not acted. 
The  Europeans  reply  to  the  first  point  that  Germany's  former 
cascade  tax  system  undercompensated  at  the  border,  both  in 
·terms of the tax on imports and the rebate on exports. The change 
to a VAT system-thus merely removed  an  unfair advantage which 
imported  goods formerly enjoyed  in  the  German  market  and  an 
unfair handicap to German goods in  international trade. 
On  the  basic  theoretical  question,  Europeans  make  the  point 
that American  officials  have  been  unable  to  prove  the  extent  to 
which direct taxes are passed on to the consumer in higher prices 
or the  extent to  which  indirect taxes  are  not.  More  importantly, 
they argue that to bend GATT rules to permit compensation at the 
border for direct taxes  would  be  unfair,  unworkable,  and  would 
open a Pandora's box of international contention. 
When  it  comes  to  assessing  the  trade  dama~e to  the  United States  from  EC  tax  harmonization,  US  officials  (in  the  Executive 
Branch if not in the Congress) take a more  relaxed view than they 
did a few years ago. 
COUNTERVAILING  DUTIES  OFFEND  EUROPE 
In  other  areas,  the  United  States'  self-portrait  of  open-handed 
·liberality .is  blemished. 
One  practice  which  particularly  angers  Europeans  is  the  US 
Treasury  Department's  recourse  to  the  imposition  of  "counter-
vailing  duties"  on  imports  of  goods  allegedly  benefiting  from  a 
"bounty" or export subsidy. 
The  US  countervailing  duty statute,  unlike  countervailing  duty 
practices of other nations and  in  conflict with  GATI rules,  does 
not require a determination of injury to an  American industry. The 
Executive  Branch  has no  flexibility in  applying  it.  It must be  im-
posed automatically whenever an  imported product is found to be 
enjoying a bounty,  even if it is a mutually beneficial item  of trade 
which does not harm American industry or employment. 
There has also been an increase in the number of US complaints 
that the Community is dumping goods on the US  market. Here, the 
US  interpretation of an  injury to  ~ domestic  industry strikes the 
Community as alarmist, tending to focus more on. minimal damage 
than material damage. Yet it is proposed changes in  the US  Anti-
dumping Regulations that cause the Community most anxiety.  For 
example, one proposal would allow the Secretary of the Treasury 
to determine the fair value of a product according to any method 
that seems  appropriate to  him  in  cases where  the  home  market 
price  of  an  export  is  difficult  to  determine.  Such  discretionary 
leeway,  the  Community  maintains,  is  incompatible with  both  the 
GATT and the Geneva Antidumping Code, both of which define an 
import's  value  either  in  relation  to  the  price  on  the  exporting 
country's  market  or  in  relation  to  the  export  price  to  a  third 
country, or to the  product's production cost. 
US  CUSTOMS  ASSESSMENT  STACKED  AGAINST  EUROPE 
In  the  area  of customs  classification  and  nomenclature,  in  1950, 
most  of  the  major  trading  nations  adopted  the  Brussels  Tariff 
Nomenclature  (BTN)  which  defines  customs  values  and  pre-
scribes a uniform system of duty assessment based on  a standard 
nomenclature with a limited number of tariff schedules. The United 
States is practically the only major holdout, although in the sum-
mer of 1972,  the President asked  the Tariff Commission to study 
ways of converting US tariffs into BTN. 
The current US  system  retains  an  extremely complicated,  arbi-
35 trary, and variable tariff structure that leaves foreign firms export-
ing to the  United States in doubt about the amounts of duty they 
will  have  to  pay.  This  uncertainty  is  compounded  by  arbitrary 
changes in  classifications. 
A  related  problem for the foreign exporter is  the  US  system  of 
duty assessment.  Under the  Brussels Tariff Nomenclature  duties 
are assessed on the sum of cost, insurance, and freight (CIF). The 
United States divides imports into three  groups.  Most duties are 
levied on the free on  board  (FOB)  price.  Some  500  categories of 
products,  however,  pay duties on  the  basis  of their value  in  the 
home market or their FOB value,  whichever is higher. 
For  organic  chemicals,  rubber  soled  shoes,  canned  clams, 
knitted woolen gloves and mittens whose value  does  not exceed 
$1.75  per  dozen  pairs,  for  instance,  the  duty  is  based  on  the 
American selling price (ASP).  ASP  is the wholesale price of com-
parable America~ products, including all expenses and  profits, as 
determined by the American industry concerned. 
In practice, ASP  boosts the value by which duties are multiplied 
by  anything  from  twice  to  four  times  the  invoice  value  of  the 
imported product.  It gives American  producers an  ironclad price 
advantage  in  competing  with  imports.  In  the  field  of  synthetic 
organic  chemicals  where  sales  are  made  in  bulk,  price  is  the 
decisive element in competition.  In the  dye field, for example,  US 
duties are assessed on  "standards of strength" determined as  of 
July 1,  1914.  This practice doubles or triples the  level  of the  US 
duty. The ASP system, incidentally, is a flat violation of GATT. 
The  history  of  the  controversy  over  ASP  illustrates  a  more 
general problem which irks foreign nations trading with the United 
States-the way in which the US constitutional system itself places 
them  in  double jeopardy. 
In  1967,  in  the  concluding  days  of the  Kennedy  Round  trade 
negotiations,  the  American  negotiators agreed  to abolish  ASP  in 
return  for substantial  reciprocal  concessions  by the  EC,  Britain, 
and other nations. But Congressional approval was required. As of 
the fall of 1972, Congress still had  not acted upon the requests of 
the  Johnson  and  Nixon  Administrations  to  repeal  ASP,  with  no 
prospect of action  before the  election.  Indeed,  Wilbur  Mills and 
other  influential  Congressmen  have  takeri  the  position  that  in 
repealing ASP,  the United States would  b'e  giving away one of its 
only  non-tariff barriers for  nothing  and  should  instead  use  it to 
bargain for further concessions.  In other words, the horse should 
be  sold twice. 
This problem has  led  more  than one  veteran  of trade  negotia-
tions to insist that any future international negotiation on non-tariff 
36 barriers must  be  preceded  by  a  grant of  authority  from  the  US 
Congress to the American negotiators. 
"VOLUNTARY"  RESTRAINTS  IRK  EC  EXPORTERS 
The  Constitutional  ploy  is  used  with equal  effect when  it comes 
to  erecting new barriers to  imports into the  US  market.  Starting 
in  the Fifties, the  Executive Branch began pressing the Japanese 
Government to rein in  unilaterally exp.orts  to the United States of 
a wide range of textile and other products. In 1962, multilateralized 
pressure resulted in the long-term cotton textile agreement under . 
which  major producing  nations  agreed  to  curb  their  exports  of 
cotton textiles to  importing  nations. Though  supposedly a tempo-
rary arrangement, it has been extended twice and is currently due 
to expire  October  1,  1973.  Then  in  1968,  the  State  Department 
played  midwife  for  a  "voluntary"  agreement  among  European 
Community and Japanese steel companies to limit exports to the 
United States. This agreement has  been  extended  to  1973.  Later 
followed  the  Nixon  Administration's 18  month-long  effort  to  per-
suade the European nations, Japan, and the Far Eastern textile pro-
ducing nations to agree to curb exports of man-made and woolen 
textiles to the United States. When  the Europeans refused to play 
ball, Washington turned the full force of its pressure upon Japan. 
In  each  case,  the  State  Department,  acting  for  the  Executive 
Branch,  has told the foreign  governments concerned that  it sees 
no  need  or  justification  for  "voluntary"  restraints  on  exports  to 
the  United  States  but that they are  necessary  in  the  interests  of 
freeing  trade,  since without  them  Congress  will  insist  upon  im-" 
posing  mandatory  legislated  quotas  on  imports  of the  products 
involved. 
To our trading partners, this often used  tactic has  a distasteful 
flavor.  In  addition,  the  Community  wonders  whether  it  is  com-
patible  with  its  antitrust  rules.  Beyond  that,  it  is  a  self-fulfilling 
threat, as was illustrated  in the man-made and woolen textile case. 
When the Administration took the line that if the Japanese did not 
agree  to voluntary  limits  on  their  textile  exports  to  the  United 
States,  Congress  would  do it for  them,  it became  politically  in-
evitable  that  that indeed  would  be  the  outcome.  When  the  Jap-
anese  finally  refused  Washington's  demands,  the  Administration 
found itself required politically to support Wilbur Mills' proposal for 
a  mandatory  quota,  a proposal  which  originally had  been  made 
with  the  idea  of  strengthening  the  Administration's  bargaining 
position vis-a-vis Tokyo. Once the White House had backed textile 
quotas, Rep.  Mills felt"that it would be impossible to slam the door 
on  quotas  for  other  products.  The  legislation  eventually  placed 
37 before  Congress  called  for  quotas  on  shoes  and  under  certain 
circumstances on a wide range  of other goods. 
DISC:  EXPORT  SUBSIDY  OR  COMPETITION  EQUALIZER? 
Another  US  action  has  sparked  protests  from  around  the  world, 
the  tax  deferral  on  50  per  cent  of  export  profits  granted  to 
Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC's) of which there 
are  more  than  2,000.  The  "DISC  Handbook  for  Exporters,"  pub-
lished by the  US  Treasury,  blandly announces: 
"US exporters can now receive ... tax treatment for their export 
income more comparable to that afforded by  many foreign  coun-
tries to their exporters." The  deferred tax payment can  be  "rein-
vested  by the  DISC  in its export business,  or invested in  certain 
Export-Import Bank obligations, or in 'producer's loans' to related 
or unrelated US  producers for export. ...  "41 
Other exporting  powers maintain  that the  DISC  constitutes  an 
export subsidy, outlawed by Article XVI  of the  GATT.  The United 
States retorts that countries such as. France, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium  have  had  similar  provisions  for  years,  and  that  since 
taxes  will eventually be  paid,  DISC cannot be  considered  a  sub-
sidy.  Complaints have  been  filed·with the  GATT;  bilateral US-EC 
consultations have been held,  and there the matter rests for now. 
The DISC provision for producer's loans raises the broader and 
potentially explosive issue of export credit in  general.  The terms 
of sale  in  any large export order constitute an  increasingly impor-
tant part of the price. As China and the Soviet Union shop abroad 
for  plants  and  machinery,  this  issue  could  turn  into  a  veritable 
powder  keg.  Already,  for  fear  of  a  cutthroat  credit  war,  the 
Community  members  coordinate  their  long-term  credits  among 
themselves,  and  within the  wider context of the  Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and  Development (OECD).  Within the con-
text  of  OECD  consultations,  however,  the  United  States,  unlike 
the  Community members,  has  refused  to  participate  in  arrange-
ments for consulting its partners before concluding the sale. 
SNAGS  TO  FREE  COMPETITION  ABOUND 
Other obstacles to entering the American market abound. There ·is 
the Buy American Act of 1933 which directs the Executive Branch 
to give  a preference to American over foreign  goods in  Govern-
ment buying. Price differentials, which can be changed at any time 
by  Executive  Order,  currently are  6  per  cent  to  12  per  cent for 
civilian US  Government agencies and 50 per cent for military pro-
41.  DISC: A  Handb~ok for Exporters.  US Treasury Department,  Washington,  DC. 
January 1972,  page 1. 
38 curement,  at  home  or overseas.  In  addition  to  the  general  pro-
visions of the Buy American Act, more than 90 per cent of procure-
ment  under  US  foreign  aid  programs  is  restricted  to  purchases 
of American  products.  Moreover, a growing list of  states  are  en-
acting  Buy  American  rules  of  their  own.  "(9  be  sure,  the  Com-
munity  and  other  agencies  follow  equally  or  more  stringently 
protectionist  public  procurement  policies.  But  the  United  States 
cannot claim  injured innocence. 
The list is  tedious.  The  United States has many extensive legal 
"escape clause" provisions for granting tariff or quota protection 
to  industries, firms,  or workers which  can  demonstrate that they 
are being injured or threatened with injury from imports. Proposed 
legislation would make this protection still easier to get.  An  outer 
hedge of  administrative,  technical,  health, and sanitation  regula-
tions further shields the American market.  In  addition, since 1955 
the  United  States  has  enjoyed  a  general  waiver  excepting  its 
agricultural trade  restrictions from  GATT rules. 
As  to  whether  the  United  States  obtained  reciprocal  conces-
sions  in  postwar tariff  bargaining,  by  any  accepted  quantitative 
measure it did, with the  exception of those  products for which  in 
the  immediate  postwar  period  European  nations  temporarily  re-
tained quotas for balance-of-payments purposes. There were  also 
some cases where  US  negotiators traded  quantitative for  qualita-
tive  gains.  The whole  notion of reciprocity is  a poser for econo-
mists.  Many  of  them  question  its  usefulness,  arguing  that  any 
nation is  better off with  no  tariffs,  though better off  still,  in terms 
of economic efficiency and standard of living, if its trading partners 
also  have free  markets.  However,  this  line  of argument  does not 
appeal to politicians. 
CLEAN  AIR:  NEW  TRADE  PROBLEMS? 
US  concern  for the  environment  and  the quality of life  has  also 
caused some ripples in trade relations with the Community.  Euro-
pean  automotive  standards,  set for  a less  energy dependent and 
less polluted continent than  the  United States,  are  less stringent. 
To continue exporting to the lucrative US  market, European manu-
facturers will  have  to modify cars  and  trucks  to  meet  American 
standards,  thus raising  production  costs. 
Both the  Community and  the  United  States accept the OECD's 
"the polluter pays" principle, that the polluter must bear the cost 
of cleaning  up  or preventing  damage to the  environment. Within 
. this broad consensus,  however; lies vast  room  for disagreement. 
A  government  could,  for  example,  allow  companies  large.  tax 
write-offs  for  the  costs  of  pollution  abatement  programs.  To  a 
39 competing manufacturer denied this advantage in another country, 
such a tax allowan·ce might look like a  subsidy~ 
The emerging  economic interests connected  with  international 
harmonization may never have to go to formal  negotiations, if the 
success  of  discussions  so  far  within  the  OECD  and  the  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization  is an  indicator.  If they  do,  however, 
the  Community's  unified  set  of  standards  for  its  nine  members 
should speed agreement in the broader context. 
MULTINATIONALS: .TWENTIETH  CENTURY  NATION-STATES 
The  Community's emerging  common  industrial  policy poses  one 
last  set  of  potential  commercial  problems  for  the  mighty  US 
multinational corporations now thriving in Europe. 
The  EC  Commission  has  drafted  an  ambitious blueprint for  a 
common  industrial  policy to promote a  genuine  European  indus-
trial  network.  Included  are  measures  to  speed  up  removal  of 
technical barriers to  trade within the Common Market,  liberaliza-
tion of access  to public contracts,  the  abolition of tax  frontiers, 
formation of a European capital market, and a common statute for 
a  European  company.  Once  enacted,  this  policy will  attempt  to 
foster conditions encouraging and enabling European  companies 
to take advantage of the common market now being perfected. The 
fact is that industrial development still lags behind its potential. 
The value  added  to  the  gross Community  product per  person 
employed  in  industry is  roughly one-third  less than  in  the  United 
States. Average wages and  salaries in industry are  less than half 
US levels.  Industrial mergers to assure economies of scale appro-
priate  to  a  larger market  have  tended  to  occur  between  either 
companies  of  the  same  country  or  European  and  American 
companies. 
Understandable  as  this may be,  the  implications for American 
corporations,  which  generally  have  been  better  able  than  their 
more  parochial  European  counterparts  to  take  advantage  of the 
flowering of the  Common Market,  are not entirely reassuring. 
The  competitive  thrust  of the  Community's  common  industrial 
policy is clear. A Common Market official speaks of a common in-
dustrial development  policy as  "essential" to  "acquire a  reason-
able degree of technological independence of outside countries." 
However,  the  creation  of  a  European  company  law  raises  the 
possibility  of  discrimination  against  US  firms:  "One  problem  is 
how to define a company· as 'European'. Is this a matter of location 
or control? Must the  headquarters be  in the Community,  or must 
effective control be  in the  hands of Community nationals?"42 
42.  Barre,  Raymond.  Address  to  the  Fifth  International  lnvesiment  Symposium. 
Belaggio,  Italy,  June 2,  1970. 
40 The  EC  Commission,  announcing  its  program  for  a  common 
industrial  policy,  justified  it  in  competitive terms: 
"Europe's  relative  lag  in  industrial  development and  the  keen 
competition  from  outside  companies-either  through  direct  ex-
ports or through the subsidiaries they hav.e  set up in the Commu-
nity-make the creation of transnational European firms essential, 
particularly in the  advanced  technology  industries."  43 
An obvious point of potential friction is over public procurement 
policies. These are seen by Europeans as a major means of giving 
European  firms  a  leg  up  in  competition  with  American  multi-
national corporations. 
Another European leader set the problem in the wider perspec-
tive of US-Community relations: 
"At present,  the  subsidiaries of non-European  corporations are 
in a position to share, together with the  national  industrial  activi-
ties (when these exist), the advantages of national preferences in 
public  procurement,  at  the  same  time  being  part  of  powerful 
multinational  organizations  capable  of  developing  worldwide 
strategies for the production and  marketing of their technology. 
"This notwithstanding,  I  hope  that  these  organizations  do  not 
oppose the suggested course. An  accepting attitude on  their part 
would  be convincing evidence that multinational corporations are 
willing  and  able  to  reconcile  their  efforts  for  maximizing  their 
opportunities with  the  loyalty they owe to the policies of the host 
countries.  In  our case  the  host  countries  are  the  members  of  a 
Community." 44 
Thus, while there may and  probably will  be  problems  in  these 
areas,  as  in the  others which  currently  are  inflamed  by  friction, 
they are the  inevitable by-products of the growth in  strength  and 
cohesion  of the  European Community.  In  any  case,  nostalgia for 
an  American  hegemony which was foresworn 20  years ago  is no 
guide for realistic  policy.  Many  American  statesmen  indeed wel-
come the emergence  of a strong  and  unified  European economy 
and  see  in  it  opportunities  for  strengthening  the  machinery  of 
the  international  economy. 
43.  European Community Information Service, Press Release, "Commission Memo-
randum. Gives  Outline for Common  Market Industrial  Policv."  Aoril  1.  1970. 
44.  Colonna di Paliano,  Guido.  Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee 
of the  US  Congress, July 27,  1970. 
41 COMMUNICATION 4 
As  the worldwide search  for new  international  rules  begins,  the 
atmosphere of confrontation has subsided.  A  willingness to com-
municate has been  reestablished, and new or revised  frameworks 
for  solving  problems  must  be  found  before  communication  fails 
again. 
Responding  to  the  need  for a closer  institutionalized dialogue, 
the Community in the fall of 1971  established an  officiai'Delegation 
in  Washington.  Informal  contacts  have  also  been  given  renewed 
attention  by  exchanges  between  US  and  European  legislators. 
At the end of one such visit to the United States, a member of the 
European Parliament commented: "We came to the United States 
with  all  of Europe's problems on  our minds.  Now we  are  richer. 
We  return  with  all  the  problems  of the  United  States."  The  late 
House of Representatives Majority Leader, Hale Boggs, concurred 
in the usefulness of these exchanges: "The more you meet people, 
the more the prospects for solving problems improve. If you don't 
do anything, you  know  nothing will  improve."45 
45.  European  Community  No.  158,  European  Community  Information  Service. 
Washington,  DC,  August/September 1972,  page 3. 
42 DIALOGUE  NEEDS  INSTITUTIONS 
These contacts continue as  the United States and  the Community 
focus on preparations for forthcoming trade, monetary, and secur-
ity negotiations. The  fact that these  preparations have  started  in 
earnest seams to  have  improved  the climate.  One  European thus 
summed  up  the  current situation: 
"The  conditions  of  dialogue  between  Europe  and  the  United 
States  exist.  But  organizations  barely  exist.  This  dfalogue  will 
necessarily take place on  the economic and  monetary plane, and 
one must hope that it will not be  a dialogue of the deaf.  However, 
on the pol.itical and military level, everything depends on  progress 
within Europe itself:"  46 
He  thus identified one of the  difficulties that have  plagued US-
EC  relations,  the  difficulty  of  dialogue  between  two  partners  of 
comparable size but of unequal political authority. With its enlarge-
ment  to  nine  members,  the  Community  overnight  became  the 
world's  leading  commercial  power.  But  unless  its  institutions 
acquire adequate  political  power it could become "an economic 
giant  without  a  political  head,  incapable  of  defending  itself,  a 
monster"whose very survival would be  in  question."47 
For  trade  and economic  affairs the  Community  has  a  cumber-
some  procedure  for  delegating  authority  to  negotiators;  but  it 
works.  If  the  Community's  decision-making ·process  sometimes 
looks unwieldy,  the  US  legislative process of  approval  is  no less 
of a puzzle  to many  Europeans;  Commented  one  of them:  "it is 
often  hard  to  ascertain who  in  the  United States  is  influential  in 
making  what  decision  and  how";  but,  he  admitted,  "in the final 
analysis there is always the President who speaks for America  ....  "48 
A "summit" meeting of the political leaders of the Community of 
Nine and  the US  President has  been suggested  in  some quarters 
as  a means  of bridging  this institutional  difference.  It could also 
alleviate  difficulties resulting  from  the conduct of negotiations  in 
inter-related  fields  at  differenf times  and  by  separate  organiza-
tions. Lastly,  it could avoid the  danger of negotiations' beginning 
with points of view already frozen  at a  low comprehension  level 
concerning  the  real  issues.  A  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
study mission to the Community identified the dangers inherent in 
this approach: 
46.  Lafoy,  Jean.  "Does  Europe  Have  a  Future?"  Foreign  Affairs  October  1972, 
page 161. 
47.  Reverdin,  Olivier.  Report on  the Political  Consequences  of the  Enlargement 
of the European  Economic Community, Consultative Assembly of the  Council 
of Europe,  Strasbourg,  France,  May 4,  1972,  page  2. 
48.  Dahrendorf, Raff.  "Ten Voices for Europe Is Nine Too Many." Vision.  January 
1972,  page 59. 
43 "Today we  find  talks  in  four  separate  fields  conducted  in  cir-
cumstances conducive to an  exaggeration of differences which is 
often without proper regard for our common interests. Sometimes 
this exaggeration seems  to come  from  the  bureaucracies  of our 
governments which deal  with  specific  matters  of trade,  defense, 
monetary affairs, and foreign aid. The views of these officials often 
represent the limited interests of their agencies and their domestic 
constituencies and  thus  preclude  a  balanced  consideration.  De-
fense  questions,  for example,  should  not  interfere  with  qur  sub-
stantial and vital trade relations ....  " 49 
BOTH  SIDES  MUST  GIVE  . 
Although  the  broad  outline  of  Common  US-EC  interests  has 
emerged,  the  forthcoming  negotiations  will  exact  concessions 
from  both major trading partners,  as  was  seen  at the time of the 
Smithsonian  Agreements.  (see  page  8).  A  veteran  observer  of 
the  Atlantic  scene  explains  the  changes  in  US-EC  relations  in 
terms of game theory. Just after the war,  "Europe needed  some-
thing from the Untied States that it was in the US  interest to give. 
The game theorists wotild call this 'a positive sum game,' in which 
both  sides gained." Since  the emergence  of a collective Europe, 
" ... transatlantic  issues  are  increasingly  becoming  a  zero-sum 
game where one side loses and the other wins. Europeans require 
things of the United States that would involve American sacrifices. 
and vice versa .... 
"The danger is that the zero-sum  games that now characterize 
many  economic  and  political  issues  between  the  United  States 
and the European Community will become negative-sum games-
that  both  sides  would  lose.  A  negative-sum  game  would  be  a 
mercantilist trade war or an  international monetary crisis in which 
the entire international monetary system  collapsed." so 
Without resorting to  game  theory jargon, it can be  simply said 
that the common interest on  both sides of the Atlantic is so deep 
and pervasive that any approach to dealing with shared problems 
dictates the  acceptance of common  objectives.  These  objectives 
must  be  fixed  at  a  sufficiently  high  level  so  that  the  dialogue 
cannot fall to the level of adversary proceedings. Economic, mone-
tary,  and  trade  affairs today  loom  too  largely  as  primary  factors 
in  world  politics  to  be  treated  at  the  level  of  a  greengrocer's 
dispute. 
49.  The  European  Community and the  American  Interest,  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  92nd  Congress,  2nd  Sess.,  March  1972,  page  40. 
50.  Geiger,  Theodore.  "Atlantic  Relations:  A  Negative-Sum  Game?"  European 
Community  No.  160.  European  Community  Information Service,  Washington. 
DC,  November  1972,  pages  14-15. 
44 GLOSSARY 
ASP: American Selling Price, a customs valuation procedure of the 
United  States  under  which  the  US  wholesale  price  of  certain 
products,  notably chemicals,  is  used  instead  of the foreign  price 
in arriving at  the customs duty to be  assessed. 
CAP:  abbreviation for the EC's common agricultural policy, which 
is designed to rationalize agricultural  production and  establish a 
Community-wide  syste·m  of supports  and  import controls.  It  now 
covers  over  90  per  cent  of  the  Community's  agricultural  pro-
duction. 
COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Members are 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, 
Romania,  Bulgaria, and Outer Mongolia. 
COMMUNITY  OF  SIX:  European  Communities.  See  EC  below. 
COMMUNITY  OF  NINE:  the  six  founding  members  and  the  three 
new  members,  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  and  Denmark.  See 
EC,  below. 
COMMON  MARKET:  popular  name  for  the  European  Economic. 
Community.  See EC  below. 
CUSTOMS  UNION:  a group of countries that eliminates tariffs on 
trade between its members and adopts a common tariff on imports 
from  the  rest of the  world. 
DAC:  Development Assistance Committee  of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and  Development. 
ECSC:  European Coal and Steel Community. See EC below. 
EEC:  European Economic Community. See EC  below. 
EC:  European  Community or European  Communities.  The  collec-
tive name for the European Coal and Steel Community, the Euro-
pean  Economic  Community,  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community.  Founding members were Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Ger~ 
many,  the  Netherlands,  and  Luxembourg.  The  United  Kingdom, 
Ireland,  and  Denmark  joined  on  January 1,  1973. 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association. Members were the United 
Kingdom, Denmark,  Norway, Sweden,  Switzerland, Austria,  Portu-
gal, and Iceland. Denmark and the United Kingdom withdrew after 
deciding to  join the  Community. 
FREE  TRADE  AREA:  a group of countries that eliminates tariffs on 
trade between its members· but which does not adopt a common 
tariff on  imports from  the rest of the world. 
GATT:  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade.  An  international 
accord signed  in 1948 to foster growth of world trade.  Provides a 
forum  for multilateral tariff negotiations and,  through  semiannual 
45 meetings,  a means for settling trade disputes and  for discussing 
international trade problems.  Has  more than  80  members. 
GNP:  Gross National Product, usually defined as  the sum total  of 
goods and services produced  in  an  economy and  net  foreign  in-
vestments.  This term  is  not to be  confused  with  gross  domestic 
product which is the sum total of final goods and services, exclud-
ing  intermediary  production,  produced  within  national  borders, 
plus import taxes. 
KENNEDY  ROUND:  trade  negotiations  which  took  place  in  the 
GATT from  1964  to  1967.  The  impetus for  the  negotiations  and 
US  participation were made possible by the passage of the  1962 
Trade Expansion Act. Resulted in lowering duties by some 35 per 
cent  in  industrial  products,  and  somewhat  less  in  agriculture, 
through agreements covering some $40  billion in world trade. 
MFN: Most-favored-nation. The policy of non-discrimination in  in-
ternational trade which provides to  all  nations the same customs 
and  tariff treatment as  given the so-called  "most-favored-nation." 
NTB'S:  Non-tariff barriers. Provisions such  a~  quotas, import regu-
lations, buying policies, and freight rate differentials which restrict 
the flow of goods by means other than tariffs. 
OECD:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and  Development. 
P.L.  480:  US  legislation first engaged in 1954 which channels US 
food and fiber aid to needy countries. 
UNCTAD:  United Nations Conference on  Trade and Development. 
VAT:  Value  Added Tax.  An  indirect tax which .has  the effect of a 
retail sales tax. Tax is collected on the value added to a product 
at each  stage that the  product passes  before  reaching  the  con-
sumer. 
YAOUNDE  CONVENTION:  Convention  joining  the  Community  to 
Madagascar,  Mauritius,  and  17  African  States  which  are  former 
colonies of Community member states. 
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